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Résumé 
 
Ce mémoire de maîtrise propose une réévaluation de la question désormais 
centenaire de la « fission » ou « nucléarisation » du ménage joint hindou (MJH). En 
utilisant la perspective dite « atomiste » développée par Michel Verdon (1998), nous 
jetons les bases d’une nouvelle modélisation de la formation et de la composition des 
ménages au Maharashtra postcolonial. Le mémoire sera divisé en quatre sections. La 
première introduit les principaux éléments de la perspective « atomiste », qu’elle 
opposera, dans la seconde section, aux axiomes « collectivistes » et aux explications 
« culturalistes » généralement rencontrés dans l’analyse ethnographique des ménages en 
Inde occidentale. La troisième section fournit une application qualitative de la perspective 
atomiste, et ce, en dressant un bref portrait ethnographique du ménage au Maharashtra 
pour les trois décennies suivant l’indépendance de l’Inde. La quatrième section offre une 
application statistique de la perspective atomiste en utilisant des données 
socioéconomiques et sociodémographiques rassemblées dans cinq rondes des National 
Sample Surveys (NSS) indiens; combinant nos hypothèses atomistes avec les « taux 
d’autonomie résidentielle » développés par Ermisch et Overton (1985), nous quantifions 
les tendances et divers déterminants de la composition des ménages au Maharashtra 
durant les années 1983 à 2004. Nos résultats ne montrent aucun signe d’une 
nucléarisation du MJH durant les années couvertes par les NSS, et indiquent qu’il s’est 
même produit une intensification de la subordination résidentielle et domestique des 
jeunes couples basés au Maharashtra entre 1993 et 2004.  
Mots-clés : India; Maharashtra; ménages; formation des ménages; typologie des 
ménages; interactions intra-residentielles; famille; famille jointe hindoue; changement 
social; démographie sociale.  
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Abstract 
 
This M.Sc. thesis offers a reappraisal of the century-old issue of the ‘fission’ or 
‘nuclearization’ of the hindu joint household (HJH). Using Michel Verdon’s ‘atomistic 
perspective’ (1998), we provide a new modelling of household formation and 
composition in postcolonial Maharashtra. The thesis is divided into four major sections. 
In the first section, we introduce the main lineaments of the ‘atomistic’ perspective and 
we oppose it, in the second section, to the ‘collectivistic’ set of axioms and the 
‘culturalist’ explanations generally used in ethnographic analyses of household formation 
and composition in Western India. In the third section, we apply Verdon’s atomistic 
framework by presenting a brief qualitative portrait of the household in Maharashtra for 
the first three decades after India’s independence. The fourth section offers a statistical 
application of the atomistic perspective using socioeconomic and demographic data 
available in five separate samples of India’s National Sample Surveys; combining 
atomistic hypotheses with Ermisch and Overton’s (1985) ‘loneship ratios’, we quantify 
the effects of several determinants of residential autonomy and household composition in 
Maharahstra for the years 1983-2004. Our results show no sign of a nuclearization of the 
HJH in Maharashtra, and indicate that there was even a rise in the residential and 
domestic subordination of young Maharashtrian couples from 1993 to 2004. 
Key words: India; Maharashtra; household; household formation; household typologies; 
intra-household relationships; family; hindu joint family; social change; social 
demography. 
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Introduction 
 
In India, studies on the household have often been confounded with studies on the 
family. For this reason, we must first declare that the general aim of this thesis is to 
readdress, though in quite different terms, the question of the fission or nuclearization of 
the hindu joint household (HJH). While we acknowledge that household typologies and 
the very concept of ‘household’ raise some serious theoretical issues (most of which are 
summarized in Netting et al. (1984)), we are here forced to adopt somewhat incomplete 
definitions for the purpose of introducing the topic in the next paragraphs. We will 
momentarily define the household as a group of individuals domiciled in a common, 
identifiable dwelling unit; we will label ‘joint’ (i.e., the HJH) any household including 
two or more patrilaterally related couples and ‘nuclear’ any household composed of only 
one married couple and their dependent children. 
One of the first statements on the fission of the HJH can be found in Sir Edward 
Gait’s report on the Census of India of 1911. While Gait thought he had discerned the 
signs of an ongoing nuclearization of the traditional hindu joint family, he was in fact 
referring to a then surprisingly low average number of individuals per household and to a 
high proportion of nuclear households in the whole Indian population – to the likes of 
those observed in England (Gait 1913; in Caldwell et al. 1988: 108). But the imprecision 
was not merely conceptual. Half a century later, new data has shown that Gait’s diagnosis 
was amiss (Orenstein 1961): households in 19
th
 century India were no more populous 
than they were in the first decades of the 20
th
 century. In fact, the whole country even 
experienced a rise in average household size until 1981 (Shah 1998b: 59-66). As for data 
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on household types, many authors contended that the presence of a large proportion of 
nuclear households in the population was not necessarily a sign of the nuclearization of 
the HJH (e.g. Goode 1970: 2; Uberoi 1993: 384-385). More precisely, Shah argued that 
households are always embedded in a ‘developmental process’ (A concept which slightly 
differs from Fortes’ ‘development cycle’ (1958)). in which they gain or lose members, 
but that these additions and subtractions of members do not induce discontinuity between 
household types: a nuclear household may soon become a HJH with the marriage of one 
of its sons, just as a HJH may soon become nuclear with the death of the household head 
and the residential separation of his sons and widow (Shah 1998b). Concurrently, Gould 
(1968) highlighted the need for a more dynamic modelling of household structure (A 
concept which we equate with that of ‘household composition’) in India; only then could 
one distinguish a ‘meaningful change’ in household types from a casual replacement of 
household members attributable to a ‘normal’ developmental cycle or developmental 
process. 
Therefore, even if we stick by Gait’s equivocal indicators, we cannot conclude 
that the HJH has nuclearized in the last two centuries. The numbers would rather depict a 
situation of relative stability in the size of households, and even of upward trend in the 
proportion of HJHs (Shah 1998a: 3). This realization could have suggested the need to 
formulate a new set of axioms and inquiries. The perennial question ‘how and why is the 
HJH nuclearizing?’ could have given way to its inverse, that is, ‘how and why is the HJH 
surviving?’. Delving into the literature, we find instead that the presence of HJHs is taken 
to be culturally given and, from an epistemological standpoint, is not deemed 
problematical.  
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This standard of explanation dates back to the ‘indological phase’1 in the study of 
the Indian family. In many of these classic writings (e.g. O’Malley 1934; Srinivas 1952; 
Ross 1961; Gore 1968), the ideal-type joint household was described as a component of 
the ideal-type joint family; amid the many functions and principles governing joint family 
life were some functions and principles binding family members together in a single 
household. Many detailed descriptions of family life and kinship structure in India were 
then produced, some reaching nearly encyclopedic proportions (e.g. Karve 1965). But 
despite their impressive ethnographic range, these structural-functional representations of 
the Indian family were plagued by two major epistemological flaws; not only did they 
deflate the household to a state of epiphenomenon of family norms, they often relied 
upon teleological arguments to adduce that HJHs were somewhat inherent to India’s 
traditional familial system. 
Let us illustrate this attitude by briefly revisiting one of the first analyses on the 
family in urban India. In a schematization relying upon an orthodox structural-functional 
framework, M.S. Gore examined the determinants of traditional family norms in India. In 
its simplified version, his model associated four ‘Functional Requirements of the Joint 
Family as a System’ to twelve ‘Institutionalized Patterns Facilitating Their Fulfilment’ 
(1968: 33-35). Gore could hardly be more explicit in his effort to link a given set of 
‘functions’ to another set of ‘structures’ or ‘norms’. Yet, the presence of a given set of 
norms/structures cannot be explained solely by highlighting the functions these norms 
allegedly performs, if only because functions are always established in reference to a 
                                                          
1
 ‘Indological’ here refers to the field of study known as ‘Indology’, which we could define as a branch of 
‘Orientalism’ since it is devoted to the study of the cultures of the Indian subcontinent. The field can also 
be designated as ‘Indian Studies’ or ‘South Asian Studies’, while ‘Indologists’ themselves are often being 
referred to as ‘Indianists’. 
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given normative/structural context (see Verdon 1991 for a lengthier demonstration on this 
point). In short, norms can explain functions just as much as functions can explain norms. 
Regarding Gore’s model, one could even argue that the ‘functional requirements’ of the 
hindu joint family are teleologically dependent its ‘institutionalized patterns’. In theory, 
another set of ‘institutionalized patterns’ could very well satisfy the ‘functional 
requirements’ of the joint family (there is no ‘intrinsic link between the two) but, in 
practice, the ‘institutionalized patterns’ themselves provide the framework inside which 
the ‘functional requirements’ can be defined. As a result, we argue that Gore’s structural-
functional model of the HJH, as well the abundance of indological representations so 
conceived, teleologically posited the presence of the HJH more than they actually 
explained it. 
Regardless of how the presence of the HJH was exactly posited, it meant that the 
presence of nuclear households then had to be accounted for. Even during the period 
covered by classic indological works, empirical data made it clear that nuclear 
households were abundant in India. Moreover, the so-called modernization of India led 
many authors to assert that the HJH, even if it had not yet nuclearized as Gait had 
anticipated, was indeed about to give its way to a dominant, westernized, nuclear 
household. Following the authors of the indological phase, sociologists and 
anthropologists of the ‘social change’ phase in the study of the Indian family sought to 
ascertain this ‘modernization hypothesis’ with new types of explanations. However, they 
kept trying to explain household formation and composition in terms of factors 
explaining the fission of the HJH – even if they were to clarify that the HJH was 
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apparently stable. Despite their shared scepticism of indological accounts, the 
divergences between ‘social change’ authors were numerous. 
Influential among these writers was Goode (1970), who argued that the 
industrialization and urbanization of India would result, among other consequences, in an 
increasing proportion of neolocal and nuclear households. However, he himself admitted 
that the data then available on the matter did not show any clear trend that would 
corroborate his view. He perceived the lack of nuclearization as a ‘lag’ attributable to 
India’s modest levels of industrialization and urbanization, whereas Conklin concluded 
that “there is no empirical evidence to show that a joint family could not provide a good 
adaptive vehicle for solving the problems of urbanization or industrialization” (1973: 
748)
2
. At any rate, Conklin demonstrated that the HJH could also be considered as a 
‘good fit’ to the everyday necessities of modern India, even if the permanence of 
household composition came at the cost of radical changes in intra-household 
relationships – changes brought about by education and literacy, most notably. Likewise, 
Caldwell et al. wrote that India was and would continue to be characterized by a ‘stem 
family system’ designed to ensure to care of the elderly (1988: 130). In short, 
disagreements between ‘social change’ authors were founded on different sets of 
residential ‘needs and responses’ entailed by the modernization of India. Yet, as was to 
become clear, these diverging hypotheses were built on a common ground. 
                                                          
2
 Here, Conklin uncovered another teleologically tainted formulation of the structural-functional type, since 
there is no intrinsic link to be found between the emergence of the nuclear household and the necessities of 
modern life (e.g. salaried work, labor movements and specialization, etc.). Because they allow for 
economies of scale, extended households can easily be considered as ‘well adjusted’ to advanced industrial 
economies, especially during harsh economic times (e.g. Angel and Tienda 1982). 
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Perhaps the foremost analyst of the household in India, A. M. Shah (1974, 1998, 
1999, 2005) argued that Indian households were formed around the normative ‘principle 
of the residential unity of patrikin and their wives’ (PRUPW), and was the most explicit 
in stating that studies on Indian households should primarily be concerned with “the 
measurement of the conformity to and deviation from this principle” (1974: 16). But 
whereas conformity to a norm hardly demands an explanation, deviation from a norm has 
to be accounted for. In other words, the presence of households that did not abide by the 
above principle (these are nuclear households, single parent households, single adult 
households, etc.) called for an explanation, whereas that of HJHs did not since it was 
presupposed by the PRUPW. While Shah’s ideas may not appear very distant to those of 
his predecessors, one of his main achievements was nevertheless to evacuate the 
teleological references usually made to posit the presence HJHs in India. In establishing 
the PRUPW as the starting-point of his analysis, Shah replaced (perhaps unconsciously) a 
teleological assumption with a plain and unequivocal axiom. Viewed in this light, one 
could say that Shah clarified and simplified what was implicitly established in earlier 
studies. 
But instead of prompting a renewal in the study of Indian households, Shah’s 
work rather seems to have marked the end of an era. His many theoretical specifications 
(we will examine them in the next sections), most of which dated from his 1974 
ethnography, were part of the last notable theoretical impulse in the study of household 
formation and composition in India. Patel wrote that the Indian family “has received 
somewhat inadequate attention in comparison with the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s” (2005: 
22). In subsequent works still centered around issues of household formation and 
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composition, authors have mostly tried to substantiate and synthetize the main lines of 
argument of Shah and his predecessors (e.g. Uberoi 1993; Patel 2005), or have tried to 
verify similar hypotheses with new survey data (e.g. Hill 1982; Caldwell et al. 1988; Ram 
and Wong 1994; Chakrabortty 2002; Niranjan et al. 2005). The results of these analyses 
often were contradictory, if only because they were buttressed by different definitions of 
household types. 
Other recent studies have modelled household formation and composition as 
causes rather than as effects. These have concentrated most notably on issues of social 
demography such as women’s autonomy and its impacts on fertility and sex ratios (e.g. 
Dyson and Moore 1983; Das Gupta et al. 2003; Chakraborty and Kim 2010; Banerji and 
Vanneman 2011) or the influence of living arrangements on the health of the elderly (e.g. 
Cain 1986; Dharmalingam 1994; Bhat and Dhruvarajan 2001; Rajan and Kumar 2003; 
Sen and Noon 2007; Husain and Ghosh 2010; Pal and Palacios 2010). There are also 
works which have shifted the focus of analysis on ‘processes’ of household dynamics 
rather than on household ‘structures’, thereby downplaying the dichotomy between joint 
and nuclear households while emphasizing the plurality of residential realities and 
trajectories in India
3
. For instance, the growing literature on gender issues has 
successfully (and rightly) promoted a less ‘unitary’ view of the Indian household (e.g. 
Agarwal 1994: 3) by emphasizing inequalities, conflicts, diverging interests or patterns of 
domination taking place inside households. 
Needless to say, these more recent trends, far from having elucidated the 
mechanics of the nuclearization or permanence of the HJH, have rather left the issue 
                                                          
3
 See D’Cruz and Bharat (2001) for an extensive review of this literature. 
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aside. And what is more, they often took the presence of the HJH for granted in the very 
same way Shah and earlier authors did. In other words, the amount of work built on this 
tacit consensus justifies the need to examine it once again. 
Departing from previous views, we offer a reappraisal of the so-called fission of 
the HJH. In short, we believe that nuclear households in India were inadequately 
apprehended; we hold that the explanandum of analyses on household formation and 
composition in India has to be the presence and relative stability of the HJH over time. 
For this period, we will need to develop a new typology of household types and, more 
importantly, to establish a new set of axioms about household formation in India. To our 
knowledge, only Michel Verdon’s ‘atomistic’ framework allows for such an undertaking, 
as it is also the direct inspiration of the present paper. Thus, our objective is to provide a 
qualitative and a statistical application of Verdon’s framework for Indian households. 
Instead of engaging this task for India as a whole, which would be almost unfeasible 
given the country’s overwhelming diversity, we will confine ourselves to Western India, 
with a more specific focus on the state of Maharashtra. We shall limit the scope of our 
inquiry to the period following India’s independence, which we will label as 
‘postcolonial’. 
The thesis will be divided into four major sections. In the first section, we 
introduce the main lineaments of Michel Verdon’s ‘atomistic’ perspective; these can be 
retrieved more comprehensively in Verdon’s Rethinking Households (1998), in which the 
author is primarily concerned with European households. In the second section, we 
expose the ‘collectivistic’ set of axioms and the ‘culturalist’ explanations frequently used 
in ethnographic analyses of household formation and composition in Western India. In 
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the third section, we apply Verdon’s atomistic framework by presenting a brief 
qualitative portrait of the household in Maharashtra for the first three decades after the 
independence, a period of time when ethnographical data on Indian households was most 
detailed. The fourth section offers a statistical application of the atomistic perspective 
using socioeconomic and demographic data available in five separate samples of India’s 
National Sample Surveys (NSS); combining atomistic hypotheses with Ermisch and 
Overton’s (1985) ‘loneship ratios’, we will try to quantify the effects of the various 
determinants of residential autonomy and household composition in Maharahstra for the 
1983-2004 period. 
Let us finally emphasize that the argument presented in this thesis is primarily 
prospective: it suggests an alternative framework to synthesize qualitative and 
quantitative modelling on the subject of the Indian household, but does not formally 
realize this synthesis, as we believe it could only be elaborated with additional (and more 
recent) data from an ethnographic fieldwork and a longitudinal survey. 
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1. Michel Verdon’s ‘Atomistic’ Perspective 
 
In the same way that an approach based upon the characteristics, propensities and 
interactions of individuals could be labeled ‘individualistic’, the atomistic approach is 
centered upon the characteristics, propensities and interactions of ‘residential atoms’. 
Verdon uses the concept of household as a synonym of his own concept of residential 
group. A residential group is a unifunctional group formed around the activity of 
residence, where “residence consists in occupying part or all of a dwelling-place in an 
exclusive manner, regularly or intermittently, for the purpose of sleeping” (1998: 37)4. 
Residential groups, however, are not monolithic entities. Studies are profuse with 
cases of conflicts in which the internal divisions of households are exposed. But if intra-
household dynamics cannot be presumed to exist in a state like the one suggested by the 
concept of the ‘unitary household’ (e.g. Agarwal 1994), it also cannot be reduced to the 
interactions happening between the household’s individual members5. In other words, 
Verdon’s objective was to build a typology that integrates intra-household power 
relationships, but that does not reduce the household to an epiphenomenon of 
interindividual interactions. Accordingly, he argued that he could decompose households 
into minimal residential units (MRUs), or atoms. Drawn directly from an article by 
Ermisch and Overton (1985), MRUs are defined as “collections of individuals whose 
coresidence is unproblematical [or axiomatic] within a given culture” (1998: 53). Five 
types of MRUs can be found in European households: 1) a single adult; 2) a single 
                                                          
4
 For details on specific criteria of membership of residential groups, see Verdon 1998: 43-46. 
5
 Verdon offers an insightful demonstration on how such a reduction deflates the household to the state of 
mere epiphenomenon (1998: 24-34). A lengthier demonstration on the need to extirpate (conceptually) the 
group from its interindividual interactions can be found in Verdon 1991. 
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mother with her dependent children (a ‘matricell’); 3) a single father with his dependent 
children (a ‘patricell’); 4) a couple without dependent children; 5) a couple with 
dependent children. 
Yet, the sole delineation of MRUs is not sufficient to account for power 
relationships happening inside the household. For his approach to be properly atomistic, 
Verdon needed to insert MRUs within a set of axioms that would address their 
interactions in household dynamics. His demonstration rests upon a universal, socio-
psychological axiom rooted in individuals, stating that  “‘normal’ adults, men or women, 
prefer not to be bossed around in their economic and/or domestic activities, and wish to 
control the running of their everyday life” (Latreille and Verdon 2007: 71). 
Notwithstanding its individualistic roots, this axiom will affect the interactions taking 
place between cohabitating MRUs. For instance, a young spouse’s desire for 
independence against her controlling mother-in-law may result in conflicts opposing the 
former’s MRU (the young couple) against the latter’s MRU (the old couple). Thus, 
Verdon passes from an axiom on ‘individual propensities’ to an axiom on ‘MRU 
propensities’, and posits that MRUs axiomatically desire their domestic and economic 
autonomy
6
. He will define domestic autonomy as the MRU’s ability to control the 
management of its domestic activities, while economic autonomy concerns the MRU’s 
ability to control its own labor and resources (2007:72)
7
.  
                                                          
6
 While power relationships are treated, conceptually speaking, as relationships between MRUs, they are 
“often lived as interpersonal relationships” (1998:47). Verdon’s decision to treat them as such should be 
seen as a conceptual maneuver to enable fruitful comparisons and not as an attempt to describe reality from 
an ‘emic’ standpoint (55). 
7
 Economic autonomy should not be confused with economic self-sufficiency. 
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Observation reveals that in Europe, where houses are generally owned or rented 
individually (as opposed to corporate or joint ownership), to reside in one’s house 
exclusively or in a superordinate position usually entails domestic and economic 
autonomy. Hence, Verdon postulated the axiom of the propensity of any MRU toward 
residential autonomy, defining it as a situation where a MRU “has a sole occupancy of a 
dwelling-unit or part of a dwelling-unit that it owns, or in which (or a portion of which) it 
has a right to reside because it pays a rent” (1998 : 54). In Europe, MRUs seek residential 
autonomy because it is a necessary and by and large a sufficient component of their 
domestic and economic autonomy
8
. 
From an epistemological standpoint, it follows that the presence of only one MRU 
in a household does not require any explanation: it is ‘presupposed' by the axiom of 
residential autonomy. However, the coresidence of several MRUs within a household is 
deemed problematical and requires an explanation. These explanations, Verdon states, 
are to be built in terms of forces and/or hindrances constraining certain MRUs to 
coresidence. Forces are defined as coercive measures, often of intra-residential origin, 
binding a MRU to coresidence into a subordinate position (e.g. the threat of 
disinheritance by a senior couple or a patriarch). Hindrances are usually extra-residential 
constraints that restrain MRUs from accessing their residential autonomy (e.g. 
unfavorable economic context, unemployment, aging and widowhood, the unavailability 
of resources to build a decent house, etc.). 
                                                          
8
 It is important to note that while subordinated MRUs will shy from coresidence for all the previous 
reasons, superordinated MRUs often have other reasons to look for it (for the pleasures of ordering others 
around, or to make sure that they receive care and support in their old days, etc.). 
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As we mentioned, this new set of axioms also impacts on the delineations of 
household typologies. Since the length of the present thesis does not allow for many 
specifications, we shall mainly retain the distinction made by Ermisch and Overton 
(1985) between simple households, in which only one MRU resides, and complex 
household, in which two or more MRUs reside. When studying Indian households, then, 
how are we to define the HJH? After all, the existing literature does allow for an 
abundance of definitions (Kolenda 1970). As suggested in the introduction, the HJH will 
here be defined by the coresidence of at least two patrilaterally related couples (MRUs of 
type four or five). Throughout the paper, they will also simply be referred to as ‘complex 
households’. 
An atomistic typology must finally distinguish different types of complex 
households on the basis of their respective power configurations. For example, a HJH 
may comprise two MRUs related vertically, but the vector of power can flow in three 
directions between them. The dominant MRU may be the parental couple (e.g. the 
patriarch being the individual owner of the family’s household and land) or the younger 
couple (e.g. because the ageing parents are disabled and need support). In the former 
case, we speak of a HJH with a downward vector of power; the latter is a case of a HJH 
with an upward vector of power. If the coresidence between the two MRUs was to be 
relatively equalitarian, we would have a HJH with a horizontal vector of power. Thus, we 
can now find three different types of HJHs, although these have an identical household 
composition. 
Verdon exemplified possible variations in the axioms of the atomistic approach 
outside Europe. The penultimate chapter of Rethinking Households offers an atomistic 
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analysis of the household in Abutia villages in Eastern Ghana, where Verdon conducted 
an ethnographic fieldwork in the early 1970s. The Abutia residential logic was quite 
different from the European one; notably, the coresidence of spouses was deemed 
problematical, owing in part to economic transformations dating back from the 1920s. 
Latreille and Verdon’s (2007) article in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) also 
exhibited a set of axiom slightly different than the one applied in Europe. Thus, if the 
axioms of the atomistic approach can vary in space and in time, how are we to define 
them adequately for the postcolonial Maharashtra? The data required to examine this 
issue can hardly be obtained in the Indian censuses or other statistical sources, whereas it 
can be found more readily in qualitative or ethnographic sources.  
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2. The Collectivistic Approach in the Study of Indian Households 
 
In order to emphasize the originality of the atomistic approach in the study of 
Indian households, we need to identify the sociological/anthropological tradition against 
which it was elaborated. The chronology of this tradition was already summarized in the 
introduction, where we also alluded to a common thread running through analyses on 
household formation and composition in India, that is, the axiom which establishes the 
presence of the HJH as non-problematical. 
Our general objective in the present section is to relate this common thread to 
Verdon’s diagnosis on the ‘collectivistic’ perspective in the study of European 
households. We start by outlining the main characteristics of this collectivistic 
perspective and its concomitant ‘culturalist’ mode of explanation. Then, we provide a 
brief depiction of the ‘ideal-type joint household’ such as described by authors of the 
‘indological phase’ in the study of the Indian family, insofar as this ideal type constitutes 
some form of desideratum for collectivistic accounts of the Indian household. Lastly, in 
order to typify the main features of collectivism and culturalism in the study of 
households in Western India, we review the conceptual and theoretical frameworks of 
Shah (1974) and Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell (1988). (Perhaps the choice of these two 
ethnographic works calls for a justification; simply put, we consider Shah’s early 
conceptual and theoretical framework to be the clearest and most synthetic exposition of 
a collectivistic set of axioms in the study of Indian households, and we believe the work 
of Caldwell et al. offers the most eclectic and illustrative example of a ‘culturalist’ 
apprehension of the evolution of the HJH.) 
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2.1. The ‘Collectivistic’ Approach 
Verdon isolated two opposite and mutually exclusive approaches in the study of 
household composition and formation in Europe, each one holding a different set of 
axioms and thus clinging to different types of explanations of what they deem 
problematical. The first is the ‘atomistic’ approach, which we already introduced in the 
previous section, and the second is the ‘collectivistic’ approach. 
The collectivistic approach is not based on residential atoms. Implicitly or 
explicitly, it assumes the propensity of individuals to coreside in complex households of a 
given type, thereby focusing on factors explaining the presence of less complex and/or 
nuclear households (i.e. on factors explaining the fission of complex households). For 
Verdon, collectivistic models almost invariably explain the fission of complex 
households by invoking the randomness of familial demographic trajectories
9
 and, 
mostly, “the penetration of capitalism and its individualistic values” (1998: 21), that is, a 
change in people’s tastes and values attributable to a cultural change. And because 
demographic factors can rarely (if ever) entirely account for the presence of simple 
households (a family may have the ‘demographic potential’ to form one large complex 
household but its members may nonetheless reside in separate households), Verdon 
argued that collectivistic sets of axioms almost invariably lead to ‘culturalist’ 
explanations of the fission of complex households. In fact, collectivism and culturalism 
can literally be seen as ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Latreille and Verdon 2007). If one 
posits a proclivity for families and/or individuals to coreside in complex households, one 
can hardly identify another set of factors than cultural factors to account for the inversion 
                                                          
9
 What Attwood (1995) described as a ‘demographic roulette’ (permanent celibacy, childlessness, 
premature death, etc.). 
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of this propensity and the sudden apparition of an ‘individualist pull’ endangering the 
unity of complex households. 
As we will show, Verdon’s depiction of collectivistic axioms and culturalist 
explanations in the study of European households resembles the foundations of several 
landmark analyses of households in Western India. But before we begin, a proper 
diagnosis of collectivistic analyses in Western India demands that we define the level of 
‘residential complexity’ which these analyses would posit as axiomatic. This takes us 
back to the indological definition or representation of the HJH. 
 
2.2. The Ideal-Type Joint Household in the Indological Literature 
 According to custom, the ideal-type joint household is a component of the ideal-
type joint family, which is itself patriarchal, patrifiliative, and patrilocal (Orenstein 1965: 
35-61). It is patriarchal in the sense that all its members should abide by the orders of the 
household head (karta), who is the oldest male in the family. It is patrifiliative in the 
sense that all males of the family gain inalienable rights to family and ancestral property 
by virtue of their birth to a male trustee (or sometimes by virtue of adoption by that 
trustee), who is the family’s patriarch; the same should be true of women, although their 
property rights are rarely, if ever, enforced. Finally, it is patrilocal in the sense that wives 
are expected to move into their husband’s household, in cohabitation with the latter’s 
parents, brother(s) (married or single), and single sister(s). Even in contemporary India, 
patrilocality remains the dominant household formation pattern for all married couples. 
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The ideal-type joint family has many functions (residential, commensal, domestic, 
ritual, and economic activities, as well as corporate ownership of the family and ancestral 
property, etc.) which should encompass the same groups of individuals until the death of 
the parental couple. Ideally, all individuals involved in these activities and in the 
ownership of family property should co-reside in the same household. Sacred texts 
allegedly indicate that married brothers should even continue to live together after their 
parent’s death, but it is acknowledge that this prescription is virtually never followed. 
Generally, once their father is dead, brothers perform a post-mortem per stirpes partition 
of the family property and living arrangements (meaning that every brother virtually gets 
an equal share, independently of how many children he and his brother(s) have), and all 
try to initiate a joint-family of their own. Of course, a married man without a son cannot 
create his joint family and household (except in some rare cases of adoption), but it is 
considered problematical for a man with one or more son not to govern over his own joint 
family and household. 
 While the patriarch is alive, then, the permanence of the joint-household is 
intimately linked to norms governing intra-household relationships. These relationships 
are marked by the dominance of men over women and of senior members over younger 
members; siblings and in-marrying wives are expected to interact with each other along 
these lines of authority. Spouses should avoid public displays of affection. The 
relationship between a father and his adult son(s) is to be a formal one, with the son(s) 
obedient to the father’s orders and possessing no jural autonomy as long as the latter is 
alive. Similarly, in-marrying wives are expected to be obedient to the household head’s 
wife, their mother-in-law, who is in charge of domestic activities. The relationship 
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between the mother and her son(s) is more ambiguous, though authors described it as a 
“strong, tender, unchanging, dependable bond” (Mandelbaum 1970:  62). On the one 
hand, a widowed mother is expected to be subordinate to the authority of her son(s); on 
the other hand, a mother (widowed or not) may also wield domestic authority over her 
son(s) and daughter(s)-in-law, authority which sometimes even included “the regulation 
of sexual relations” between spouses (ibid.). 
 These definitions of familial and residential criteria of membership, norms, 
interactions, functions and so on, form the very core of the indological representation of 
the hindu joint family and household. While numerous analyses were directly inspired by 
this classical representation, the accumulation of additional ethnographic and statistical 
data progressively called it into question. These challenges can be more or less reduced to 
a simple puzzle: why is it that, throughout the 20
th
 century, India’s residential landscape 
was characterized by i) a relative stability (or even an increase) in the size and proportion 
of joint households combined with ii) an equally stable and important proportion of 
nuclear households (e.g. Orenstein 1961; Goode 1970; Shah 2005)? Authors building on 
the indological depiction of the HJH were caught in the crossfire. They could not wholly 
accept the indological representation because its ‘fit’ with statistical and ethnographic 
data was often ambiguous (the HJH was not as omnipresent as previously thought, and 
the discrepancies between traditional norms and actual behaviors received more and more 
evidence on an ethnographic level); nor could they totally reject it, for the ‘social change’ 
hypotheses also failed to account for the endurance of traditional norms and residential 
practices in a large proportion of the Indian population. A compromise was needed. 
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2.3. The Collectivism of A. M. Shah 
A. M. Shah’s The Household Dimension of the Family in India (1974) can be 
partly understood as a struggle for conceptual precision in the study of Indian households. 
Like Verdon, Shah firmly distinguished the household from the family by defining the 
former as a ‘group’ and the latter as a ‘genealogical model’ (1974: 3); however, Shah 
defined the household as a multifunctional
10
 group whereas Verdon viewed it as a 
unifunctional group. Like Verdon, he identified minimal units within the household. As 
we will see later, these are rather akin to the ‘minimal household units’ delineated by 
Ermisch and Overton (i.e. and to Verdon’s MRUs). Shah then differentiated simple and 
complex households according to the number of units they would incorporate: simple 
households were defined by the residence of only one unit while complex households 
were marked by the coresidence of two or more units. 
Another central concept of Shah’s framework is the household’s ‘developmental 
process’, a concept largely inspired by Fortes’ ‘developmental cycle’, but qualified 
somewhat differently. As used by Shah, the concept merely infuses dynamism in 
household typologies by including ‘processes’ in which household gain or lose members, 
or in which new households are formed while others are dissolved. Shah argued that 
Fortes’ acceptation of the term inadequately implied a linear and historically static 
conception of patterns of household formation (1974: 84-85). In his own ethnographic 
fieldwork in Gujurat, he observed that these developmental patterns are far from cyclical, 
that there is an abundance of possible sequences of household formation and dissolution, 
and that these sequences had changed to some extent with the westernization of India. 
                                                          
10
 “The household is a residential and domestic unit composed of one or more persons living under the 
same roof and eating food cooked in a single kitchen” (Shah 1974: 8). 
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Hence, Shah wanted his ‘developmental process’ concept to account for the plurality and 
historicity of residential trajectories in India. But how was he to ramify Fortes’ 
‘developmental cycle’ without tracing household trajectories in a state of complete 
disorder? Shah wrote that household types “are not discrete and haphazard; there is some 
order in them, and they are understandable only as parts of that order” (1974: 14). In 
other words, how was he to inject ‘order’ into his ‘developmental process’? 
Shah isolated three types of potential sources of regularity in the patterns of 
household formation in India. The first source is merely mathematical: in a closed system 
with a constant number of households, a rise in the proportion of one household type will 
necessarily be accompanied by a decline in the proportion of at least another household 
type, and so on. Regularities emerge if specific patterns can be found regarding the 
variations between these proportions (e.g. a given increase in HJHs being always 
accompanied by a proportional decline in the number of stem and/or nuclear households), 
but Shah remains vague as to the exact configuration (or even about the existence) of 
such a system in India. The second source of regularity is family norms (e.g. the norms 
behind the patrifiliative transmission of family property, the norms supporting the 
authority of the patriarch or the arranged marriage of young people, etc.). The third 
source of regularity comprises residential norms governing household membership and 
intra-household interactions; it is here that Shah actually introduced the PRUPW. 
Henceforth, Shah’s demonstration almost perfectly echoes Verdon’s diagnosis on 
the collectivistic approach. By positing the propensity of patrikin to live together in 
complex households, Shah needed to explain the circumstances in which they lived 
separately from one another, that is, circumstances in which the PRUPW was violated. 
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He built these explanations around i) his developmental process argument (e.g. nuclear 
households can be seen as ‘soon-to-be HJHs’), ii) the randomness of demographic events 
(e.g. some couples do not have a son, and therefore cannot form a HJH), or iii) the 
‘westernization’ of values spreading from professional urban classes. One was therefore 
to distinguish between nuclear households incorporated in an ‘unproblematical’ Indian 
developmental process, and nuclear households that were in fact ‘problematical’ because 
having left the Indian process for the ‘westernized’ one. Only in the presence of the latter 
could one truly speak of the nuclearization of the HJH (1974: 101). 
Accordingly, one could argue that his three types of explanations can be more or 
less reduced to the third (culturalist) type. Explanations of the first type only command 
further inquiries: in any analysis of household formation and composition, the 
developmental process per se is actually what needs to be explained (i.e. it is the 
explanandum and not the explanans). For instance, we need to know why sons leave the 
parental household after the death of the patriarch and not before his death, or how and 
why the marriages of the children can be delayed or precipitated, etc. Explanations of the 
second type offer only partial elucidations: there is ample evidence of families having 
two or more married sons who nonetheless share separate houses, and this has to be 
accounted for in a collectivistic perspective. We are left with explanations of the third 
type, which are nothing but culturalist explanations of the fission of complex household.  
Shah noted that conflicts do emerge between household members and sometimes 
even lead to residential partition (1974: 74). This observation could have led him to 
formulate atomistic axioms, though he seemed to consider these partitions as mere 
residuals of a broadly satisfactory explanation. In his later works (1998c, 1998d, 1998e, 
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1999, 2005), Shah placed these tensions at the center stage of his analysis, but still did 
not reject his collectivistic stance. He acknowledged that some individuals have desires 
and propensities which run counter to the ideal of the HJH, but he did not address how 
this fact challenged or contradicted the PRUPW. Shah assumed that the PRUPW is 
normative, meaning that “there are deviations from it (as in case of all norms)” (1974: 
16). Simply put, norms cannot impose a uniform developmental process in a given 
population because other factors must come into play. Shah wrote extensively about these 
other factors (ownership of land, the pooling of incomes, caste membership, individual 
idiosyncrasies, etc.), as we will see in the next sections, but was not able to integrate them 
into a ‘new and improved’ model on the Indian household. In other words, as he became 
more thorough in his descriptions of household dynamics, Shah added complexity to his 
analysis, but was not able to reduce this complexity to a unified theoretical framework as 
he did in his 1974 monograph. He became more descriptive than theoretical. As a result, 
his later works, which were more exhaustive and nuanced, also lacked the axiomatic 
consistency of his earlier formulations. Nonetheless, this material proved to be 
indispensable to our own atomistic formulation.  
 
2.4. The Culturalism of Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell 
Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell took on a more sinuous line of argument for their 
analysis of ‘family structures’ in Karnataka in The Causes of Demographic Change: 
Experimental Research in South India (1988). Perhaps unintentionally, their analysis 
contains collectivistic as well as atomistic assumptions, a state Verdon labelled as 
‘axiomatic dualism’ (1998: 12). The problem with axiomatic dualism is that atomism and 
24 
 
 
collectivism are mutually exclusive; they yield opposite explanations of a same 
phenomenon, so that using both of these stances at the same time is nothing short of 
contradictory.  
Like Shah, Caldwell et al. were not able to integrate conflicting observations on 
individual propensities into an axiomatically consistent theory of household formation 
and composition. We cannot offer a decisive interpretation of Caldwell et al.’s views on 
this issue, if only because situating the book’s argument within John C. Caldwell’s whole 
bibliography on family structures and sociodemographic change (a theoretical effort 
spanning nearly 50 years) falls beyond the scope of this thesis. However, a case can be 
made that their understanding of ‘family change’ was generally made in accordance with 
collectivistic axioms. For this reason, the following interpretation stands as a preliminary 
attempt to unearth some of the epistemological outcomes of Caldwell et al.’s underlying 
assumptions on household dynamics in South India in order to see how these contrast 
with atomistic explanations. 
We begin with a conceptual clarification. Even if Caldwell et al. have merged 
conceptually the ‘household’ and the ‘family’ (whereas Shah had clearly separated them), 
we find that their definitions of the ‘family’ and of ‘family types’ normally involve the 
coresidence of family members:  
[T]he term nuclear family will mean a conjugal couple with their unmarried children. A 
stem family will describe two married couples in different generations – in our area almost 
invariably where the older couple are the parents of the younger husband. A joint family 
refers to married siblings living together [our emphasis] – in our area almost always 
brother; and a joint-stem family is the classical full pyramid where the older couple have 
with them more than one of their married children and usually grandchildren as well (1988: 
111)
11
. 
                                                          
11
 Caldwell et al.’s ‘stem family’ does not completely identify with stem families found in Europe, as there 
is no evidence of partible or preferential inheritance among brothers in India (1988: 128). 
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For this reason and also for the sake of clarity, we will continue our interpretation as if 
‘household’ and ‘family’ were interchangeable in Caldwell et al.’s work. Instead, we will 
focus on their axiomatic dualism, which we believe is more crucial to their analysis. 
On the one hand, we find collectivistic elements in the authors’ structural-
functional apprehension of the Indian household. Like we saw with the work of M. S. 
Gore, when one relates the presence of a given household type to a specific function 
being performed by this household type, one often falls into teleology and therefore 
posits the presence of this household type more than it actually explains it. Accordingly, 
Caldwell et al. wrote that the joint-stem family in India serves “two essential purposes”: 
i) “to act as an engine for marrying-off the daughters of the family” and ii) “to provide a 
training institution for a new daughter-in-law” (1988: 126). The authors admit that this 
illustration is teleologically tainted, as they specify that the second function of the joint-
stem family is not intrinsically linked to the joint-stem family (ibid.). A similar critique 
could be made when Caldwell et al. tried to account for the existence of an Indian ‘stem 
family system’ designed to ensure the care of India’s elderly. 
On the other hand, Caldwell et al. also wrote extensively about young people’s 
desire for autonomy in domestic, economic, residential or even matrimonial matters. For 
instance, they acknowledged “the pressure placed on sons to stay together until their 
sisters are married, and, even if they are becoming older, to forgo the joys of being a 
household head in their own right” (1988: 126). They also mentioned that increasing 
economic opportunities reduced the authority of the patriarch because it also reduced 
sons’ dependency of their father’s resources (1988: 248). Both of these passages imply a 
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typical atomistic formulation: if unhindered, people will strive after their own autonomy 
in everyday matters. 
As Verdon pointed out, axiomatic dualism can sometimes be reduced to a subtle 
manifestation of culturalism (1998: 23). This verdict partly applies to Caldwell et al.’s 
analysis of ‘family change’ in Karnataka but, in order to grasp the nuances of the authors’ 
use of culturalist explanations, one must consider their whole book on demographic 
change in this region. At first view, when explaining changes in fertility, in marriage or in 
education, everything happens as if Caldwell et al. considered young people’s desire for 
autonomy to be a result of cultural change: 
It is widely said that urban culture, transmitted to the villages by returning migrants from 
the town and also by the messages of cinema, has given children a new feeling about the 
limits beyond which they should not be pushed in terms of work and the minimum levels of 
needs which should be met (1988: 71). 
It is also quite frequently added that in the past, young men did not grumble about being 
denied marital sexual relations, but that the cinema and other urban or external influences 
are changing this position and that parents are beginning to take such complaints into 
account (1988: 93). 
And one could multiply instances. The extent to which Caldwell et al. actually agreed 
with these explanations of social change is not clear; nowhere in their book did they settle 
in favor or in disfavor of these ‘folk-models’ elaborated by the people of Karnataka 
themselves. But even if they did not wholly agree with such accounts, their view of 
India’s rising individualism cannot be held as equivalent to the desire for autonomy of an 
atomistic set of axioms: simply put, the former is rooted in culture whereas the latter is 
rooted in social-psychology. Once considered on a wider historical spectrum, it becomes 
easier to see how a pure ‘culturalist’ view of individualism may indeed adhere to 
collectivistic axioms: one can insinuate the existence of a traditional residential order 
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characterized by a preference for coresidence in complex households, only to signal its 
partial disruption by means of cultural change (modernization, westernization, etc.). 
As for Caldwell et al., however, a diagnosis so brief would be overly simplistic. 
We know that John C. Caldwell himself did not confine his models on the demographic 
transition to the realm of cultural change. In his earlier works (e.g. 1968, 1976, 1977), he 
repeatedly invoked a wide range of non-cultural factors (urbanization, monetization, 
mortality decline, etc.) to explain the relation between family change and the 
demographic transition in third-world countries. More recently, he even emphasized 
socioeconomic causes over ideational causes to explain family change and/or fertility 
decline in developed countries (Caldwell 2004). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that 
Caldwell et al., in the concluding chapter of their book, attempted to portray how 
economic, political, social and cultural factors all interacted to shape changes in family 
structure in Karnataka (1988: 220-259). 
However, it is impossible to be sure about the authors’ views on the relative 
importance of each of these sets of factors taken individually: “It seems clear that these 
changes … were based jointly [our emphasis] on economic changes, and on the existence 
of alternative models toward which to channel social change” (1988: 225). Many 
passages suggest an understanding in which economic and political change initially 
caused a partial disruption in the traditional sociocultural order, disruption which opened 
the way to a “model of social behavior and relationship [the ‘urban society’ of the 
‘English way’] at hand toward which the society might move spontaneously of have been 
directed by its leadership” (1988: 255). Should we accept this interpretation, we could see 
how the authors’ description of the mechanics of cultural change may have more in 
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common with the collectivistic perspective than with the atomistic perspective, even if 
the difference between these two approaches on this point may appear somewhat subtle.  
For instance, from an atomistic standpoint, the removal of a given economic 
hindrance (e.g. the creation of non-agricultural jobs allowing sons to look for 
employment outside the family farm) can be a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
nuclearization of complex households. As for the collectivistic perspective, the removal 
of the same economic hindrance, though it might be seen as a necessary condition to the 
fission of traditional complex households, cannot be held as a sufficient condition for this 
fission. In theory, without a change in people’s tastes or propensities (that is, a cultural 
change), the removal of economic hindrances could even lead people to reinforce their 
desire to co-reside (e.g. they could further benefit from the economies of scale). 
Arguably, the fact that Caldwell et al. wrote of the need to adopt of a new or alternative 
‘model of social behavior and relationship’ (1988: 255) implies that they do not believe 
that political and economic changes can be sufficient conditions for the fission of the 
HJH.  
Similarly, in his classical 1976 article, Caldwell stated that “it is apparently 
impossible (or, at least, examples are unknown) for a reversal of the [intergenerational 
wealth] flow … to occur before the family is largely nucleated both emotionally and 
economically. A fair degree of emotional nucleation is needed for economic nucleation 
[our emphasis]” (1976: 355). When analyzing the inversion of intergenerational wealth 
flows in Nigeria, Caldwell also added: “What causes this emotional nucleation of the 
family…? … This factor is undoubtedly the import of a different culture; it is 
Westernization” (1976: 352). 
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As we mentioned earlier, our objective here is not to elaborate a definitive 
interpretation of Caldwell et al.’s views on sociodemographic change. This task would 
lead us into a complex equation involving notions such as the secularization of 
demographic behavior, the emerging concept of children dependency, the inversion of the 
wealth flows between generations, the changing cost of children due to schooling, the 
growth of the non-agricultural job market, the progressive monetization of India’s rural 
economy, the rising price of dowries, the influence of family planning institutions, 
urbanization and labor migrations, etc. But if we remain concerned only with the authors’ 
analysis of household dynamics, we find that even if they often emphasized the 
importance of socioeconomic and political factors, they also tended to root individual 
propensities about residence in their ‘model of social behavior and relationship’, which 
themselves seem to be rooted more in culture than in social-psychology. For this reason, 
we consider that the authors addressed the question of the fission of the HJH mostly in 
collectivistic terms, though this collectivism was a lot more nuanced than that of Shah. 
*** 
The analyses reviewed in the present section have generally abided by Verdon’s 
diagnosis on the collectivistic perspective and its culturalist mode of explanation. We 
explored the epistemological outcomes of plainly formulated collectivistic axioms in the 
early works of Shah, but we also saw the difficulty of interpreting these outcomes when 
studying a dual set of axioms like the one developed by Caldwell et al. (1988). We then 
saw how Caldwell et al. situated their ‘models of social behavior and relationship’ in 
culture more than in social-psychology, how this impacted on their understanding of 
cultural change, and how it hinted at the presence of collectivistic postulates. Let us recall 
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that the objective of the present section was to provide a contrast between atomistic and 
collectivistic views of the Indian household. We prefer to leave definitive interpretations 
of these authors’ models to lengthier works. 
The qualitative portrait we develop in the next sections will evacuate most 
references made to cultural change. It will seek to replace them with references to 
centrifugal pulls, forces and hindrances, in conformity with the atomistic terminology. In 
other words, it will seek to translate the ethnographic observations made by authors like 
Shah and Caldwell et al. within a new conceptual framework and a new set of axioms. 
Many of these authors’ observations will be used again, but they will take a serve a 
different purpose or take a different meaning. 
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3. A Brief Qualitative Portrait of the Household in Western India 
 
First, a caveat: the portrait presented here should not be viewed as being 
representative of households in the whole state of Maharashtra. On the one hand, the 
descriptions we use come from ethnographic sources, which aim to apprehend their 
object in all its complexity before relating it to the population to which it belongs. On the 
other hand, given the state’s own diversity, a truly representative ethnographic 
description would confine us only to the most general statements, or to an endless 
enumeration of local particularities (Singh 1993). It could be said that ethnographies are 
more convenient for comparative analysis than for inferential statistics. Yet, as Caldwell, 
Reddy and Caldwell (1988: 3-20) pointed out, ‘micro-demography’12 can be very useful 
in the making of hypotheses explaining larger demographic phenomena. Accordingly, we 
wish to frame this portrait with concepts that can i) enable eventual comparisons between 
communities in Maharashtra and ii) provide variables and hypotheses for a subsequent 
statistical analysis of Maharashtrian households. 
Ethnographic sources with an exhaustive description of household dynamics in 
Maharashtra are somewhat scarce (mainly Orenstein 1965: 35-61, Attwood 1995; some 
parts in Carter 1974 and Dandekar 1986). Therefore, we had to supplement them with 
pertinent details found in ethnographies from neighbouring states. Following Attwood 
(1995), we incorporated material from Shah’s analysis in Gujurat, a state just north of 
Maharashtra; to which we added the studies of Srinivas (2002), Caldwell, Reddy and 
Caldwell (1988) and Hill (1982) in Karnataka, a state just south of Maharashtra. The 
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 ‘Micro-demography’ as used by Caldwell et al. (who could be categorize as demographers) refers to 
some form of combination of ethnographic and demographic methodology, especially used to tackle 
research topics in demography. 
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region encompassed by these three states will be labelled ‘Western India’13. Though this 
usage might seem unsatisfactory, it must be emphasized that these authors’ descriptions 
and analyses all run along the same lines, like a recurrent theme, to the extent that their 
similarities far outweigh their differences. A further expression of this common thread 
can be found in Mandelbaum’s all-India synthesis (1970: 31-133)14. Let us reiterate that 
the portrait covers only the first three decades following India’s independence (1950-
1979), since the ethnographies covering this period remain the most detailed sources of 
information on the subject of household formation and composition in Maharashtra and 
Western India. 
As we mentioned, what we attempt in this chapter is a translation, in atomistic 
terms, of pertinent ethnographic observations made on household dynamics in Western 
India. All the sources we use are secondary sources with the exception of Mandelbaum’s 
synthesis. Ethnographic fieldwork allows for a detailed household census of the locality 
under study; when combined with information from in-depth interviews, this data can be 
used to build quantitative tables on the proportion and the number of individuals living in 
each household types, the incidence of pre-mortem partition, the reasons invoked for 
partitioning living arrangements, etc. Though this type of information is essential to our 
atomistic portrait, the core of our ‘translation’ comes from material gathered from 
                                                          
13
 We acknowledge that Karnataka is often classified in ‘South India’ (e.g. Dyson and Moore 1983; 
Agarwal 1994; Murthi et al. 1995), although one could note that Gujurat, Karnataka and Maharashtra 
display many sociodemographical and geographical similarities. Our objective here is not to establish a 
classification of state patterns in household formation in India, but merely to offer the reader a device for 
knowing if a given statement concerns Maharashtra more specifically, or ‘Maharashtra and its neighboring 
regions’. 
14
 Here, we mainly refer to recurrent observations made on intra-household relationships (e.g. the vital 
importance of having at least a son, especially for women; the conflicts between the mother-in-law and her 
daughter(s)-in-law; the authority of the eldest male; the segregation of the sexes; etc.), which are 
synthesized (and sometimes enumerated) in Mandelbaum’s chapters on the Indian family. And even though 
there is not a perfect overlap between all the authors’ use of these observations, it is striking to note how 
rarely they contradict each other, as opposed to how often they complement and concur with each other. 
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participant observation. This technique enables ethnographers to observe what people did 
(the etic approach) as opposed to what people said about what they were doing (the emic 
approach), which is especially useful when there is a contradiction between these two 
realms of social life. Returning to households in Western India, participant observation 
will help us to understand how the ideal of the HJH can be held as a conviction in 
political speeches, interviews and everyday conversations (Shah 1998c), and still be 
disputed by people’s actual behavior. 
 
3.1. Atomism in Western India 
 In spite of legal and religious prescriptions, in spite of the moral ideal of the ‘the 
residential unity of patrikin and their wives’, ethnographic sources on Western India have 
described a household much less ideal and a family much less united. The numerous 
conflicts, the bold and the timid attempts by young members of the household to gain 
their independence or the counteractions of the older members to retain their authority are 
often brought to the forefront of ethnographic descriptions. The emphasis laid on the 
customariness of post-mortem partitions of family property has also concealed much 
detail about residential separations happening beforehand. In their survey of nine villages 
in Karnataka, Caldwell et al. observed that 41% of fissions of complex households were 
actually pre-mortem (1988: 120). In Maharashtra, Attwood noted that pre-mortem 
partitioning among the sons, a process usually lasting several years, often began with one 
or more sons setting up a separate hearth and room within the family’s compound, 
followed eventually by the construction of a separate dwelling (1995: 4-5). Shah wrote of 
a common pattern where older married brothers left the parental house as soon as their 
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immediate younger brother married, so that there were never more than two married 
couples in a household at the same time. In such cases, the youngest married son often 
maintained cohabitation with his aging parents (or widowed father/mother) so to support 
them in their old days. There are other cases where elderly parents rotated between their 
sons’ households, so to ‘change the mood’ and to assuage the tensions arising out of 
coresidence with their married children (Shah 1998d: 87).  
These descriptions clearly suggest that subordinate MRUs desired a separate 
household of their own even before the death of the patriarch. But before positing 
anything about their propensities, we need to posit the axiom that delineates MRUs in 
postcolonial Maharashtra and Western India. On this subject, there is an interesting 
resemblance between Verdon’s MRUs in Europe and Shah’s definition of a ‘simple 
household’15. Shah delineates six ‘units’ whose coresidence defines a ‘complex 
household’, whereas simple households are identified when one of these six units resides 
exclusively in a dwelling: “(1) husband, wife, and unmarried children; (2) husband and 
wife; (3) father and unmarried children; (4) mother and unmarried children; (5) 
unmarried brothers and sisters; (6) a single man or woman” (1974: 14). 
There are two major inconsistencies in Shah’s delineations. The first concerns 
adulthood. In his units 1, 3 and 4, he does not differentiate between dependent unmarried 
children and adult unmarried children. For instance, a simple household where old 
parents reside with their 50 year old single son hardly resembles a simple household 
where a young couple raises its toddler. Hence, why would a different set of axioms 
apply to single adults in units 1, 3 or 4, and to single adults in unit 6? The second 
                                                          
15
 The European MRUs are also used by Latreille and Verdon in the Middle East and North Africa; the 
authors even suspect they apply to most of Eurasia (2007:71). 
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ambiguity concerns unit 5: again, why are single brothers and sisters not simply 
considered as single adults of the unit 6? Shah himself acknowledges the many strains 
affecting relationships between brothers (1998e:105), which are marked by a ‘principle of 
seniority’ granting the elder brother the right to govern over his younger siblings in the 
absence of their father (Orenstein 1965: 47). If the elder brother’s authority rarely reaches 
such formal strength, much is said about the conflicts it creates between brothers 
(Srinivas 2002). The cohabitation between a single brother and a single sister, and that 
between single sisters, are rarely described in the literature. As marriage is virtually 
universal (one might even say ‘compulsory’, to a certain extent) in India, the arrangement 
seems to be temporary because brothers are expected to marry-off their sisters, while 
denying them any rights in the inheritance of the family property (Shah 1974: 72-73). 
All things considered, because the available evidence describes them as involving 
numerous patterns of subordination and superordination, the coresidence of parents and 
their single adult child(ren), as well as that between single siblings, hardly seem 
unproblematical. Consequently, we contend that the five types of MRUs delineated 
initially by Ermisch and Overton, and applied by Verdon in Europe, can also be applied 
in the case of postcolonial Western India and Maharashtra. These five types are, let us 
recall: 1) a single adult; 2) a matricell; 3) a patricell; 4) a couple without dependent 
children; 5) a couple with dependent children
16
. 
Henceforth, we need to establish the connections between Verdon’s universal, 
social-psychological axiom and the propensity of Maharashtrian MRUs toward 
residential autonomy. As for Europe and MENA (Middle-East and North Africa), the 
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 As for the cohabitation between single sisters, more ethnographic data would be needed in order to grant 
them the status of MRU. For practical reasons, especially salient in the statistical section of the paper, we 
will for now deem their coresidence problematical, and consider every single adult a MRU of type 1. 
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MRUs’ desire for domestic and economic autonomy are at the crux of their desire for 
residential autonomy: 
Usually, it is the ‘heart-burning’, the daily quarrels (kankash, kitkit) involving exchange of 
‘hot’ words, shouting, screaming, weeping, crying, and even beating – all arising mainly 
out of issues of management of routine household affairs [our emphasis] – which leads to 
household separation (Shah 1998d: 87-88). 
For the period covered by the ethnographies we used, we identified three major 
‘centrifugal pulls’ in complex households in Western India, all of which contributed to 
the desire of subordinate MRUs for residential autonomy. The first one concerns in-
marrying wives, the second one mostly involves the labor of men, while the third one 
relates to the effect of dependent children on couples’ desire for residential autonomy. 
In India, and Maharashtra is no exception, there was (and still is, to a certain extent) 
an acute segregation of the sexes involved in the household’s division of labor. While 
women were generally confined to the domestic realm, men’s occupations mostly took 
place outside the household’s walls (Orenstein 1965: 54-55). In complex households, the 
wife (or sometimes the mother) of the household head was in charge of the management 
of domestic activities, and in a superordinate position toward other women in the 
household. Orenstein noted that the younger in-marrying daughters-in-law were “given 
the most work of the most disagreeable sort and sometimes the least adequate food” (60). 
Once again, a ‘principle of seniority’ was at play in relationships between daughters-in-
law, as “the elder brother’s wife should act like a “mother” in the absence of the mother 
in law” (61). Shah mentions that disputes between women most often involved 
disciplinary authority and the distribution of work in the household. It seems that 
daughters-in-law, especially the youngest, hardly had any control over the extent and 
nature of their share of work in the course of domestic activities (Shah 1998d: 85). In this 
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context, it is not hard to understand why in-marrying wives often exerted pressures on 
their husbands to get a household of their own, sometimes only a separate hearth and a 
separate room in the family’s house, for it was to be a household by which they would 
obtain their domestic autonomy (Orenstein 1965: 45; Shah 1998e: 104-105; Mandelbaum 
1970: 104).  
 However, when household partition did occur, the importance of conflicts 
between women were sometimes exaggerated because men tried to downplay the 
importance of their own disputes in order to “maintain cooperation with regard to 
farming and other matters” (Caldwell et al. 1988: 123). And just as daughters-in-law 
were subordinated to their mother-in-law in domestic activities, sons were subordinated 
to their father in regard to the distribution and revenues of their own work. The karta not 
only managed the division of labor between household members, he was also the 
manager of the household’s budget, in which all members pooled their incomes 
(Orenstein 1965: 56-57; Shah 1998d: 86; Mandelbaum 1970:41; Caldwell et. al 1988: 
126). The control over the pooled incomes gave an undeniable authority to the karta, and 
also created tensions between brothers; for instance, one brother could feel entitled to a 
bigger share of the family’s budget due to his higher productivity, or may complain that 
his children do not receive as much food or gifts as his brother’s, etc. Such conflicts were 
treated as conflicts happening between brothers, when in fact they really stem from the 
karta’s power (Shah 1998d: 85). 
On the contrary, it was observed that the most important change induced by 
residential separation was that “the son and his wife become the masters of their share of 
income from joint economic activities” (Shah 1998d: 93). Put differently, residential 
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autonomy for a young couple, and especially for the young men, did largely entail 
economic autonomy. In circumstances where economic cooperation continued between 
the seceding son and his father, the latter may still have wielded some kind of authority in 
economic activities, but this authority was to be weakened considerably. The partitioned 
son was freer to determine his working schedule or the amount of work he was to offer to 
his cooperators. Since he possessed his own separate income, he was no longer 
disadvantaged in doing extra-hours to compensate his brother’s lack of productivity, for 
his income grew proportionately with his work load (or at least more so). In 
circumstances where the son did not continue to work with his father, as could easily 
have been the case in households with high income diversification, or in circumstances 
where the family’s agricultural land and equipment was also partitioned, residential 
autonomy did automatically entail economic autonomy.  
Lastly, many authors emphasized that as adult sons grew older, they asserted a 
further desire to affirm themselves as ‘household heads’, especially after the birth of their 
children (Carter 1970: 167). Caldwell et. al wrote of the “pressure placed on sons to stay 
together […], and, even if they are becoming older, to forgo the joys of being a 
household head in their own right” (1988: 126); Srinivas mentioned that “[t]he headship 
of an elementary family and membership of a joint family were in some respects 
incompatible” (2002: 141). What was observed was simply that the further an individual 
(or an MRU) feels to be an adult, the further the need for domestic, economic and 
residential autonomy. Verdon was quite clear upon that matter; some individuals, because 
they do not subjectively feel to be adults, might opt for a temporary subordinate 
cohabitation, perhaps even for a short time after their marriage. However, “[o]nce they 
39 
 
 
feel they ought to be treated as adults, […] our set of axioms should apply with its full 
force: they will shun cohabitation, and subordinate cohabitation in particular” (Verdon 
1998: 64)
17
. 
But in spite of all such desires, complex households were abundant in the 
residential landscape. About half of households in Orenstein’s fieldwork were complex 
households (1965: 37); about 63% of the Maratha population of Girvi, a village studied 
by Anthony Carter, were living in complex households (1970: 90); for Caldwell et al., 
whose fieldwork dates from the end of the 1970s, it was also about half the population of 
nine villages that was living in complex household (1988: 116-118). Hence, if all the 
‘centrifugal pulls’ previously mentioned are indeed an integral part of household life in 
Maharashtra and Western India, how are we to explain that HJHs and complex 
households remained in such large numbers? As Mandelbaum’s eloquently puts it, 
“centrifugal forces inevitably build up so that every family sooner or later breaches the 
ideal [of the HJH]” (1970: 37)… 
 
3.2. Explaining Complex Households in Western India 
On the one hand, it seems that superordinate MRUs cherished the ideal of heading 
their own complex household and eventually to extend it by marrying their sons and by 
trying to keep them at home for as long as possible along with the latter’s wife and 
child(ren) (Shah 1998d:87). There are certain ‘pleasures and advantages’, as one could 
put it, in ordering others around in the household. By doing so, superordinate MRUs not 
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 On this very issue, Mines (1994) provided an illuminating account of the passage to adulthood in South 
India, especially on young adults’ desire for independence in everyday activities (including their desire for 
residential autonomy). 
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only fulfilled a symbolic ideal which gives them a form of prestige (Shah 1998d: 84), 
they also gained from the many economies of scale yielded by ‘cooperation’ within a 
complex household. For instance, more household members allowed for a bigger 
household budget, and thus for bigger payments of dowries for daughters, which could in 
turn lead to hypergamy (Caldwell et al. 1988: 80-107). Putting it briefly, “[t]he joint 
household is both an instrument and a goal of social mobility” (Shah 1998c: 78). 
On the other hand, if cohabitation in a large household became unbearable for adult 
children as well as parents, mainly because of the harshness of internal conflicts, the 
parents were said to cooperate in the residential separation of their older sons while 
keeping at least one of their younger sons at home to take care of them in their old age. 
Shah claims that “the majority of the so-called joint households are composed of parents 
and one married son” (90). In such circumstances, everything happened as if 
superordinate MRUs desired their residential autonomy to free themselves of the ‘daily 
heart-burning’ of complex households, but were forced to cohabit with one of their 
children in order to ensure they get the care they need when they become disabled (Shah 
1998d: 84-87). If egalitarian cohabitation with the children in question proved to be 
unmanageable, as is usually taken to be the case, the parents simply opted for 
superordinate coresidence over subordinate coresidence (Orenstein 1965: 57). In the very 
same way, if a couple had only one son, residential separation between them was very 
rare;  and while their two MRUs were expected to adjust in order to prevent conflicts, the 
older MRU, if not disabled, always remained in a position of authority in domestic and 
economic activities (Shah 1998d: 89; Orenstein 1965: 38).  
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Hence, for as much as young and subordinate MRUs might have held the ideal to 
cooperate in a strong and united HJH, we stressed the many reasons for which they 
desired to depart from it and to start a household of their own
18
. But what happened when 
a subordinate MRU tried to partition from the complex household to which it belongs?  
The parental superordinate MRUs had many assets at their disposal in order to 
prevent it. The ownership of (or access to) agricultural land proved to be a decisive factor 
in this regard, for MRUs usually waited until they had gathered a minimal amount of 
resources – whether in cash, land, equipment or skills – before asking for residential 
separation. As Polly Hill puts it: “we may take it as axiomatic that married sons usually 
find considerable difficulty in establishing independent, viable household which are 
mainly dependent on farming their own land, unless they receive some help from their 
father (1982: 91-92)”. Interestingly, poorer sections of the society were characterized by 
a greater proportion of nuclear households, mainly because poor superordinate MRUs 
could not offer any substantial incentive for subordinate coresidence (Mandelbaum 1970: 
54; Hill 1982: 98-99; Caldwell et al. 1988: 130). As for households owning some kind of 
familial or ancestral property, there were not many sons who would give away their share 
in the corporate ownership; it was also extremely difficult for a son to receive his 
separate share before his father’s death. There is no evidence of a father formally 
disinheriting one of his sons, since the latter’s share in family property was acquired by 
virtue of birth, though authors emphasized the karta’s power to severely impede the 
process of partition. Attwood even wrote of a father who “may have quarrelled with his 
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 We do not want to imply that all intra-household relationships in Maharashtra are inimical; but, as 
Verdon puts it, “[f]rom a comparative perspective, what matters is that some circumstances bear the 
intrinsic seeds of conflict” (1998: 70). Concurrently, let us note that residential partition rarely entails the 
disruption of family ties: partitioning household members often try to locate their houses near one another 
in order to ensure familial unity (Shah 1998a: 5). 
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elder sons and driven them away, leaving the youngest in de facto, if not de jure, 
possession” (1995: 10, our emphasis). If the sons who left their parental household and 
village could have come back years afterward and legally claim their share in the family 
property, this right was rarely, if ever, enforced (Attwood 1995). 
Such submission is surprising when one considers that the Hindu Succession Act 
allows any coparcener (i.e. sons) to claim partition of the family property from the age of 
18 onwards (Derrett 1963). There were some instances of such demands, though they are 
considered somewhat exceptional and it seems that their successes were few (Orenstein, 
1965: 57). For what if the karta ignored or rejected the claim for partition? There were 
cases where the father simply had the ability to refuse to divide the family property 
(Derrett 1963: 319; Carter 1970: 91; Srinivas 2002: 139-140). In other cases, the partition 
was obstructed when the household head involved local leaders into the dispute (Srinivas 
2002). More importantly, the sons often lacked the resources to take the case to the courts 
(Hill 1982: 101), a recourse which has proved to be severely damaging for both plaintiff 
and defendant. It is said that families and individuals have been financially ruined by 
everlasting cases in courts (Orenstein 1965: 46). The Hindu law also gives coparceners 
the right to replace the karta in cases where he blatantly mismanages the family property, 
but Hill noted that sons usually did not dare take their father to the courts even in cases 
where the latter “[sold] farmland or cattle without consultation and semi-secretly 
incur[red] massive debts which are then ‘joint debts’” (1982: 97). 
Let us not forget that the karta managed the household’s pooled income, and 
thereby restricted the ability of subordinate MRUs to accumulate any resources of their 
own. Here, the mere materials and skills for building an independent dwelling are of 
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significant importance. Shah writes of poorer sections of the society where a partitioning 
MRU “can construct, almost overnight, a small hut of bamboo and thatch” (1998d: 89; 
see also Caldwell et al. 1988: 130). Those of higher socioeconomic status who desired a 
more comfortable house (e.g. in cement), if there were none available in the family 
property, could always elect to move away in search of other sources of employment and 
income. But in the absence of job opportunities, the choice rather seemed to be between 
subordinate coresidence but material comfort, and residential autonomy but very low 
living standards and poor housing conditions – a predicament which generally promoted 
patience on the side of subordinate MRUs (Hill 1982: 101). In cases where other forms of 
employment were available in the neighborhood or in town, residential autonomy was to 
come at a great cost, or was not to come at all. Many migrant workers were stuck for 
years in urban dormitories such as those described by Dandekar (1986) in Mumbai. 
Besides, sons of cultivators were often inexperienced in non-agricultural jobs, so that 
these ventures were not always lucrative or appealing enough to trigger economic and/or 
residential separation. This is not to mention the cases when migrant sons simply 
continued to pool their income within the common household budget. 
All things considered, however, Shah states that the diversification of income 
sources inside a household increased the chances of pre-mortem partition of family 
property (Shah 1998e: 102). This suggests an interaction effect between the 
macroeconomic environment and the karta’s attempt to restrict the accumulation of 
resources by subordinate MRUs, for the father’s authority could hardly have been 
sufficient to ensure subordinate cohabitation without extra-residential hindrances limiting 
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economic opportunities. Indeed, it seems that increasing job openings in postcolonial 
India have weakened the force of superordinate MRUs: 
it is claimed [that] fathers are not as tyrannical as they once were, largely because they know 
that their sons are less dependent on the fathers’ land or trade for employment, for both 
fathers and sons are always conscious of the urban and other non-farm labor markets that 
have developed in the last few decade. Fathers fear their unmarried sons wanting to migrate 
(especially an only son or one of the only one or two left in the village) or their married sons 
urging an earlier partition (Caldwell et al. 1988: 248). 
In order to prevent long term conflicts within the family, fathers often supported their 
sons’ labor migrations in town instead of condemning or trying to prevent it (Shah 1998e: 
102-104). And though a migrant son could send a part of his income to his household of 
origin (in the household budget), he could always save another part in order to build a 
house for his own MRU in the future (Shah 1974: 23-24). It thus appears that the effect of 
employment diversification on household formation was not necessarily immediate. To a 
certain extent, it prevented the pooling of incomes and enabled subordinate (and patient) 
MRUs to gather enough resources to achieve residential autonomy. In this regard, 
unfavorable macroeconomic conditions or a lack of educational and professional 
competence would be important hindrances in the way of a subordinate MRU’s 
residential autonomy. 
Likewise, the fragmentation of family land and the population density is often 
highlighted as potential deterrents to partition property and residence (e.g. Orenstein 
1965: 41; Caldwell et al. 1998: 129-130). A family land, for instance, is not uniform in its 
quality and yielding. Some parts of it may be irrigated while other parts are not; some 
may be very fertile while others may simply be uncultivable. Hence, the technical 
difficulty of separating family land in equal and functional portions is said to impede the 
whole process of partition (Shah 1998: 90-93). Kaiwar describes historical cases where 
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partition of even a most valuable irrigated land rendered its cultivation impossible, to 
which we add instances where wells were left unused because brothers did not agree 
about where it stood in the division of family property (1992: 284). In these 
circumstances, land fragmentation conspicuously reduced the economies of scale, and 
might have made it harder to obtain residential autonomy while preserving an acceptable 
standard of living (Orenstein 1965: 41). Nonetheless, authors agree that partitions 
occurred in spite of their economic disadvantages, which means that the importance of 
land fragmentation as a hindrance to residential autonomy should not be overstated. If the 
lack of agricultural land was so decisive a factor, coresidence between brothers would 
have remained important even after the father’s death, whereas it was strictly avoided. 
At midpoint between forces and hindrances binding subordinated MRUs to 
coresidence, we find another important determinant of household composition: marriage. 
According to the last National Family and Health Survey (IIPS 2007), the median age at 
first marriage in Maharashtra remains fairly low even nowadays, at 17,5 year old for 
women (17,7 for median age at first cohabitation) and 24,4 years old for men (24,5 for 
median age at first cohabitation). In fact, marriage in Maharashtra and Western India 
seems to be simultaneously a cause and an effect of residential subordination. On the one 
hand, parents generally had the power or legitimacy to arrange their children’s marriages; 
on the other hand, the in-marrying spouses’ early age at marriage gave the parents even 
more power within the household. The early age at marriage for women acted as a force 
to ensure the subordination of daughters-in-law, for as Verdon puts it, “it [is] much easier 
to rule over a teenage daughter-in-law and keep her in a subordinate position, even at the 
cost of physical violence” (1998: 102). Nonetheless, this effect should again not be 
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overstated. The young spouses eventually grow older and more insubordinate, so that 
other factors are needed to account for their residential subordination. It may as well 
happen that the young daughters-in-law, being often the most ill-treated members of a 
complex household, were consequently more inclined than their older husband to pursue 
their residential autonomy (as was the case in Latreille and Verdon 2007). There were 
some instances of divorce where the wife went back to live with her father; these are said 
to be more numerous in lower castes though very rare, if not inexistent, in higher ones 
(Orenstein 1965: 56; Shah 1998d: 88-89). 
We mentioned that a young man’s desire to become a ‘household head’ in his own 
right grows stronger as he marries and becomes a father. It is therefore not surprising to 
see the delay between men’s age at marriage and women’s age at marriage. We might 
also inquire about the traditional prescription according to which the relationship between 
husband and wife is to be devoid of romantic feelings in order to prevent the young 
couple’s ‘solidarity’ from leading to household fission (D’Cruz and Bharat 2001: 168; 
Orenstein 1965: 53-56). Interestingly, the mere context of conjugal intimacy remained a 
delicate issue in households: “The physical arrangements are such that privacy can be 
attained only briefly, hurriedly, and in darkness” (Mandelbaum 1970: 74). Nevertheless, 
the extent to which these traditional ideals and customs actually prevented young couples 
from demanding a partition is not clear, as authors acknowledge that strong conjugal ties 
did emerge between spouses and that “the public face of aloofness was not reflected in 
private, especially after family partitioning” (Orenstein 1965: 55). 
To end with, let us say a word about complex households in urban Maharashtra, for 
the previous explanations mostly revolved around residential groups in rural areas. The 
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length of the present chapter does not allow for further descriptions, but we can suggest 
some of the many lines along which we need to gather more ethnographic and statistical 
data on household formation and composition in urban Maharashtra. For if the economic 
and residential conditions of the rural populations were more diverse than is suggested in 
the last paragraphs, the urban populations should likewise not be considered as displaying 
a uniform economic and residential landscape. The distinction we can draw between 
migrant workers and the permanent urban population is a good example of such diversity. 
We mentioned that rural-urban labor migrations played an important part in the dynamics 
of household formation, and that they could induce migrant workers to a temporary 
coresidence with relatives, friends or coworkers, or that they could eventually foster 
residential autonomy for couples who accumulated enough resources. These possible 
outcomes offer additional reasons why urbanization does not necessarily or immediately 
entail a rise in the proportion of nuclear households, contrary to Goode’s argument. And 
what about the more permanent urban population? Shah (1974) observed an increasing 
proportion of HJHs in town, a rise he attributed to an increasing sanskritization of lower 
castes; yet, he also wrote of pockets of professional and westernized classes, whose 
residential trajectories displayed earlier partition and a higher proportion of nuclear or 
simple households. And what about contemporary peri-urban settlements; are commuters 
more residentially autonomous than rural or urban populations? What are the differences 
between the living arrangements in the slums, and those in the center town? Is population 
density a more important determinant of residential autonomy in urban settings? Is the 
pooling of incomes as important in towns? In the absence of exhaustive data on these 
questions, we prefer to leave them open. 
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*** 
In this section, we highlighted various centrifugal pulls that acted against the 
coresidence of MRUs, but also described various forces and hindrances that worked for 
it. We saw that a son could hardly challenge his father in order to obtain a pre-mortem 
partition of living arrangements or family property unless he possessed some form of 
bargaining power or preliminary resources, an unlikely situation because of the pooling 
of household incomes. In addition, we saw that a father could not be overly domineering 
over his sons, for the latters might have chosen to leave the complex household and 
migrate to find employment elsewhere; this occurred when the material advantages of 
staying in the parental household could no longer compensate for the ‘cost’ of the 
economic and domestic subordination imposed by a superordinate MRU. The early age at 
marriage for women and the gap between men’s and women’s age at marriage also 
accounted for the subordinate coresidence of young couples; it is not clear, however, how 
their influence evolved as the spouses grew older and more affirmative in their demands 
for independence. As was indicated in the section’s title, this portrait was all too brief. 
Nevertheless, we believe it stands as a solid base for further ethnographic inquiries as we 
tried to frame our explanations so to render them falsifiable or rectifiable. 
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4. Residential and Domestic Autonomy in Maharashtra, 1983-2004 
 
To proceed with our application of the atomistic approach for households in 
Western India, we need to quantify the effects of the centrifugal pulls, forces and 
hindrances we uncovered. To a certain extent, multivariate regressions can allow us to do 
just that. Through regression analysis, we can validate or invalidate the importance of 
several variables highlighted in the previous sections; more importantly, we can try to 
hierarchize their relative effects by comparing their coefficients or odds ratios. 
Hence, in order to provide a statistical application of the atomistic perspective 
while simultaneously tackling the issue of the nuclearization of the HJH in Maharashtra, 
we divide the present section in three parts. In the first part, we delineate MRUs inside all 
the households surveyed in five large cross-sectional samples of Maharashtra, and will 
review the hypotheses or assumptions required to establish these delineations. In the 
second part, using the same samples and MRUs, we analyze trends in residential and 
domestic autonomy in Maharashtra for the years 1983-2004. In the third part, we analyze 
the determinants of the residential autonomy of couples (MRU4 and MRU5) using 
logistic regressions, accounting when possible for the relative effects of forces, 
hindrances and centrifugal pulls. 
But before we start, let us briefly restate some of the key concepts used in our 
qualitative application of the atomistic perspective on households in Western India. A 
minimal residential unit (MRU) is a set of individuals whose coresidence is not deemed 
problematical. Five types of MRUs can be found in Maharashtrian households: 1) a 
single adult; 2) a single mother with her dependent children (a ‘matricell’); 3) a single 
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father with his dependent children (a ‘patricell’); 4) a couple without dependent children; 
5) a couple with dependent children. A complex household is characterized by the 
coresidence of two or more MRUs, while only one MRU can reside in a simple 
household. A MRU is residentially autonomous when it is the sole occupant of a (simple) 
household. In addition, we consider that a MRU is domestically autonomous when i) it is 
residentially autonomous or ii) when it is in a superordinate position inside a complex 
household. 
Owing to a set of centrifugal pulls defining the propensities of MRUs when they 
interact with each other, the atomistic perspective then requires us to explain the presence 
of complex households (while the presence of simple households is taken as axiomatic). 
These explanations are constructed around two general concepts: intra-residential forces 
and extra-residential hindrances which constrain MRUs to coresidence. In our qualitative 
portrait of the HJH in postcolonial Western India, examples of centrifugal pulls are 
women’s desire for domestic autonomy (especially to escape the authority of the mother-
in-law) or sons’ desire for economic autonomy (to prevent the pooling of incomes by the 
household head or karta); examples of forces are the ownership of arable land or the 
arranged marriages organized by senior generations; examples of hindrances are 
unfavorable economic climate or unemployment, lack of skills or resources to establish a 
new home, population density, ageing and the necessity of taking care of old people, etc. 
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4.1. Data 
We use statistical data from five rounds of the National Sample Surveys (NSS) on 
employment and unemployment in India. The five samples were harmonized and made 
available by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), a project based at the 
University of Minnesota and the Minnesota Population Center. These rounds offer 
microdata on household composition and other socioeconomic indicators over a period of 
twenty years with cross sectional samples in 1983, 1987, 1993, 1999 and 2004. The NSS 
are designed to be representative of the whole Indian population, except for some special 
groups (orphanages, military barracks, ashrams, etc.), and their coverage in each state is 
roughly proportional to that state’s share in the total national population. Maharashtra 
being the second most populous state in the country, its five samples vary between sizes 
of 44 500 individuals and 56 500 individuals.  
The National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) provided the sampling design for the 
five surveys. The sampling procedures remain essentially the same in all rounds. First, 
the population of each district is stratified in a given number of rural and urban regions 
according to population density, class of town and crop pattern (according to the most 
recent census available). In each stratum, villages are selected in the rural sector and 
urban blocks in the urban sector to form the first stage units. Afterward, a collection of 
small villages and hamlets-groups of large villages, and of small urban blocks and urban 
sub-blocks (depending on the size and density of towns) are selected to form the second 
stage units. Households are then sampled to form the third stage units, as every individual 
inside each household surveyed is included in the sample. Households from urban areas, 
as well as affluent households in both rural and urban areas, are oversampled. 
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We used sample weights harmonized across all five surveys in our empirical 
analysis. These weights were identical for individual-level, MRU-level and household-
level analysis. Aside from third stage units (households), however, survey clusters and 
strata were not available in each of the five rounds. Only the 1983 and 1987 surveys 
provided all the necessary components. Therefore, we had to complete our analyses 
without taking into the stratification and the the first and second stage units. In regression 
analysis, omitting clusters generally causes a downward bias in the estimation of standard 
errors (because of autocorrelation), while omitting strata can also entail biases in the 
estimation of standard errors (depending on the degree of homogeneity within each 
stratum and in the population as a whole). However, when we were able to compare our 
results with those we would have obtained using survey clusters and strata (with the 1983 
and 1987 rounds), we found that standard errors were only marginally affected and that 
the major results remained practically identical. 
Relatedly, just as we acknowledged the limits of our qualitative portrait’s 
representativeness for the whole state of Maharashtra, we now need to recognize the 
limits of our statistical appraisal of household composition. First, a definite application of 
Verdon’s atomistic perspective for Maharashtra would necessitate longitudinal data, since 
cross sectional samples cannot provide a dynamic analysis of household formation and 
dissolution, but only a static analysis of household composition. Second, the fact that the 
NSS samples are supposedly representative of the whole Maharashtra does not obviate 
the question of the internal diversity of the state. Inter-regional variation may be reflected 
as a significant coefficient in the estimated effects of a series of dichotomous variables on 
regional residence, and yet be so conspicuous in ethnographic analysis, that some of our 
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results should not be viewed as definitive but rather as calling for more localized surveys 
and ethnographic fieldworks. This is especially true when it comes to castes, for which 
the NSS samples contain no information. 
Lastly, the concept of household used in the five samples differs from our own 
definition of the household, and also differs between the samples themselves. In 
accordance with Verdon’s demonstration (1998: 24-46), we view the household as a 
unifonctional group formed around the activity of residence. In the NSS, it is defined as a 
multifunctional group encompassing activities of residence and food preparation and 
consumption. Except for some activities related to food preparation, which often involves 
a group exclusively composed of women (i.e. a subset of the residential group), the 
ethnographic data on Maharashtra by and large describes a very high correlation between 
the sets of individuals involved in these three types of activities; therefore, it seems 
unlikely that our definitional divergences will pose a major problem. One change in 
questionnaire design could affect the results and is described below. In the samples of 
1983 and of 1987, ‘temporary stay aways’ are counted as household members, while no 
explicit rule as to their household membership was made for the following years. If 
‘temporary stay aways’ are not counted as household members in the last three surveys, 
estimates on the frequency of residential autonomy could be biased upward. In rural 
areas, it is common for families to send one of their sons to a nearby village or town so 
that he can find a seasonal job in the non-agricultural sector; this additional income might 
help the family to make ends meet in times of economic uncertainty. Hence, the 
‘temporary exclusion’ of an adult son from his parents’ household can make their 
household simple while it is in fact complex. Nonetheless, the interviewees were asked 
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for their de jure residence; for this reason, we made the assumption that ‘temporary stay 
aways’ were included as household members in all five samples. Later on, in our 
regression analysis, we also pooled the data from all five surveys into one combined 
sample and used dummy variables for each survey to control partly for these biases. 
Notwithstanding these problems, it is important to remember that the harmonized NSS 
samples we use offer a unique opportunity of using socioeconomic variables in a large 
scale diachronic analysis of household composition in India. 
 
4.2. The Delineation of MRUs 
Let us recall that we are primarily concerned with the characteristics of MRUs 
and their interactions within households. The reconstruction of intra-household family 
links at IPUMS (see Sobek and Kennedy 2009) allowed us to delineate MRUs with great 
precision. As a result, the compromises we had to make between statistical applicability 
and what our atomistic portrait told us about MRUs’ characteristics in Maharashtra were 
minimal. Our first step was to accept these pointers of intra-household family links as 
being accurate
19, which is far from being what we could call an ‘heroic assumption’ 
because they rely in great part upon the variable ‘relationship to household head’. 
Moreover, data has shown that these “pointers agree with direct reports of family 
interrelationships more than 98% of the time” (Sobek and Kennedy 2009: 3). Another 
key assumption concerned the concept of ‘adulthood’. We needed a criterion to 
differentiate dependent children from adult children since Verdon’s socio-psychological 
                                                          
19
 Inside each household, each individual was related to his probable father, mother and/or spouse. These 
connections enabled us to delineate MRUs inside every household. 
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axiom posits that one’s desire to obtain economic and domestic autonomy, and 
accordingly a MRU’s desire for residential autonomy, comes along with ‘normal’ 
adulthood. However, we also know that individual trajectories are of decisive importance 
in determining when an individual becomes an adult, whether subjectively or 
‘objectively’ (Mines 1994). Still, when handling a database and when arguing from the 
point of view of a collectivity, we had no choice but to select an age from which all 
individuals were considered to be adults; for technical reasons, we were not able to 
differentiate between the sexes in this delimitation. Consequently, we posited that all 
single men and women in Maharashtra are adults from the age of 21 onwards – which is 
roughly the midpoint between the median ages at marriage for the two sexes (IIPS 2007). 
As for the status of cohabiting couples, because of the frequent gaps in spouses’ ages, 
they were all given the status of independent MRUs, which is not a very restrictive 
compromise since very few couples in the data were without at least a member aged 21 or 
more. Likewise, all monoparental families were considered to be MRUs, notwithstanding 
the parent’s age. In the few cases where the household head was less than 21, he/she was 
also granted a MRU status. Finally, all other individuals under 21 who were not attached 
to a spouse nor to a parent cohabiting with them were defined to be dependent of the 
household head, and thus belonging to his/her MRU. As shown in Table 4.1, only 249 
individuals in all of our five samples could be not incorporated into a MRU. From 1983 
to 2004, we can observe a slight increase in the proportion of MRU1 and MRU4 
accompanied by a slight decrease in the proportion of monoparental families and MRU5. 
The urbanization of Maharashtra is also reflected in the increasing proportion of MRUs 
found in urban areas throughout this period. 
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Table 4.1 – Number and Location of MRUs in the NSS Samples, Maharashtra 1983-2004 
 1983 1987 1993 1999 2004 
 
     
N (individuals, without weights) 52 153 56 501 46 388 44 473 46 897 
Number of individuals without a MRU 
(without weights) 
148 24 52 40 0 
      
Total number of MRUs (without weights) 17 070 19 099 16 439 15 790 17 277 
   
Proportion of MRU types (weighted %)   
MRU1 (single adult) 30,49 30,20 31,61 31,97 32,23 
MRU2 (matricell) 5,98 5,61 5,02 3,92 3,86 
MRU3 (patricell) 1,20 1,06 0,95 0,59 0,76 
MRU4 (childless couple) 14,49 14,52 15,13 16,30 18,73 
MRU5 (couple with child(ren)) 47,84 48,61 47,30 47,22 44,42 
      
% Urban (weighted %) 36,01 34,71 39,48 41,03 42,67 
 
     
Region (weighted %)    
Coastal 23,69 23,08 25,78 28,29 26,59 
Inland Western 26,38 26,75 26,78 25,84 25,47 
Inland Northern 11,21 10,98 10,72 10,57 11,08 
Inland Central 15,26 15,83 14,91 13,92 15,15 
Inland Eastern 16,99 17,47 16,04 15,91 15,79 
Eastern 6,46 5,88 5,76 5,47 5,92 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
The main advantage of analyzing household composition with MRUs is that we 
can distinguish between factors influencing MRU interactions and those influencing 
family formation (Verdon 1998: 150). For instance, a rising divorce rate can account for 
variations in the number of different MRUs, but does not have a necessary effect on the 
residential trajectories of divorcees following their divorce. The newly divorced could opt 
for residential autonomy just as they could be forced to cohabit with other MRUs. These 
interactions actually depend on the context and on other variables than the divorce rate 
itself (Verdon 1998: 154-156). In addition, MRUs enabled us to abandon the usual 
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references made to household heads. In India, however, it is theoretically justified to 
assume that individuals classified as household heads or as household heads’ spouses are 
part of a household’s dominant MRU. This assumption allowed us to establish if a given 
MRU was residentially autonomous, resubordinated or superordinated. It also allowed us 
to classify some MRUs as ‘domestically autonomous’: these were the MRUs which were 
i) residentially autonomous or ii) in a state of superordinate coresidence. 
More importantly, the use of MRUs sheds light on the statistical definition of the 
‘nuclearization of the HJH’. In order to quantify an eventual nuclearization of 
households, it is not sufficient to simply quantify the proportion of nuclear households in 
the population: we need to quantify a consistent rise in the residential autonomy of all 
MRUs. Simply put, the nuclearization of three-generational households is as much the 
result of the residential trajectories of young couples as it is of those of old widows or 
monoparental families. On the other hand, the proportion of complex households is found 
to have remained relatively stable, we would still have to discern if the vectors of power 
prompting this relative stability remained constant. Let us recall that 21
st
 century India 
will undergo an important process of population ageing. As the elderly parents may 
become increasingly dependent on their children’s care to survive (Shah 1999), it may 
well result that the HJH will endure through many decades, though with a more frequent 
upward vector of power, whereas its ‘traditional’ vector of power relationships stemmed 
downward (from older couples to younger ones). 
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4.3. Results 
4.3.1 Trends in residential autonomy in Maharashtra, 1983-2004 
Many indicators can be employed to display or decompose trends in residential 
autonomy, and these will be examined before we study the effects of independent 
socioeconomic variables (which will eventually force us to reduce the size of our samples 
by dropping missing observations). The most important of these indicators is Ermisch’s 
and Overton’s ‘loneship ratio’ (1985), which is obtained when we divide the MRUs of a 
given age and type living alone (i.e. who are residentially autonomous) with the total 
number of MRUs of that same age and type. For this reason, we will also label it a ‘ratio 
of residential autonomy’. Likewise, a ‘ratio of domestic autonomy’ divides the number of 
MRUs of a given age and type which are domestically autonomous by the total number 
or MRUs of that same age and type. 
The next tables and figures are thus concerned uniquely with ratios of residential 
and domestic autonomy. We will limit our analysis to single adults and, more 
specifically, to couples. Trends in residential autonomy for matricells and patricells will 
not be analyzed because their numbers fluctuate too heavily across samples and age 
groups, and therefore yielded very inconsistent results. Since the ratios will be tabulated 
by age and year, the age of a given MRU will be that of the husband when couples are 
concerned, and that of the unit itself when describing single adults.  
The Residential Autonomy of Single Adults 
The statistics in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show that, over a 20 year period, there was no 
common and uninterrupted trend toward an increasing or decreasing residential autonomy 
of single adults in Maharashtra either. What may look like an upward trend in one age 
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group is counterbalanced by a downward trend in another, so as to blur the role of a 
specific socioeconomic conjuncture that would explain a more general direction. 
Interestingly, variations between years are much more important for men than they are 
for women; this might be attributed to the fact that labor migrations, which numbers can 
vary greatly over time, are mostly masculine (Dyson and Visaria 2004). In addition, three 
regularities found across all five samples call for further attention (see Figure 4.1): i) the 
low levels of residential autonomy at early and later ages, ii) the low peak of residential 
autonomy for women and, of course, iii) the pronounced gender differences. 
 
 
Table 4.2 – Residential Autonomy of Single Adult Men by Age Group, Maharashtra 1983-2004 
(weighted %) 
Age 1983 1987 1993 1999 2004 Average 
Less than 25 10,52 13,52 7,87 10,74 8,82 10,29 
25-29 19,14 17,21 15,57 14,66 12,54 15,82 
30-34 25,93 23,96 24,64 26,05 20,91 24,30 
35-39 33,09 46,73 31,50 29,89 31,48 34,54 
40-44 50,07 47,18 31,33 41,17 48,24 43,60 
45-49 49,52 41,09 40,40 38,12 20,20 37,87 
50-54 31,95 32,52 29,64 30,30 25,43 29,97 
55-59 27,51 20,55 25,47 25,37 37,93 27,37 
60-64 20,64 18,41 26,07 15,71 10,26 18,22 
65-69 9,48 9,37 13,52 7,36 8,33 9,61 
70+ 8,30 6,72 11,72 11,04 7,36 9,03 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
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Table 4.3 - Residential Autonomy of Single Adult Women by Age Group, Maharashtra 1983-
2004 (weighted %) 
Age 1983 1987 1993 1999 2004 Average 
Less than 25 3,05 5,98 3,36 0,13 1,21 2,75 
25-29 6,97 5,62 2,40 1,16 1,93 3,62 
30-34 10,01 7,51 7,80 7,82 5,85 7,80 
35-39 10,53 14,96 18,29 10,29 16,43 14,10 
40-44 16,76 22,03 11,18 14,17 11,41 15,11 
45-49 16,47 18,40 16,37 16,90 23,12 18,25 
50-54 18,59 9,91 19,74 14,68 16,49 15,88 
55-59 15,08 16,59 12,25 16,19 16,06 15,23 
60-64 15,94 13,74 13,39 12,59 16,38 14,41 
65-69 14,40 10,63 14,53 16,30 15,83 14,34 
70+ 8,07 6,53 8,88 6,94 11,25 8,33 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
 
 
 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
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Figure 4.1 - Residential and Domestic Autonomy of Single Adults (on 
average) by Sex and Age Group, Maharashtra 1983-2004 (weighted %) 
MRU1♂ Residential Autonomy MRU1♂ Domestic Autonomy 
MRU1♀ Residential Autonomy MRU1♀ Domestic Autonomy 
61 
 
 
The low level of residential autonomy at later ages echoes the literature on the 
vulnerability of widows and widowers in India (see, among other, Cain 1991; Vlassoff 
1990, 1991; Nayar 2006, Desai et al. 2010). The even lower levels observed at early ages 
can be seen as a symptom of young’s people lack of resources before their marriage, 
which we addressed in the previous section. To provide a broad point of comparison, 
Canada’s loneship ratios for single adults of all ages, in 1986, averaged over 50% for 
men and 60% for women (Juby 1995; in Verdon 1998: 153). The second regularity we 
highlighted is a more perplexing one; as marriage is virtually universal in India and 
Maharashtra, the identity and characteristics of single adults in the middle age groups 
remain unclear. When reviewing the literature on ‘alternative family forms’ in India, 
D’Cruz and Bharat (2001) wrote about monoparental families, dual earners families and 
adoptive families, but made no account of the ‘alternative trajectories’ of single middle-
aged adults. Turning to the differences observed between genders, we can see that 
women’s residential autonomy peaks at an average of 18% while their average domestic 
autonomy barely surpasses men’s ratios of residential autonomy. This gap symbolizes the 
many tribulations women have to face in order to obtain whatever autonomy they can 
aspire to. If a fair share of single men seem to be able to claim their domestic autonomy 
as they grow older, everything happens as if women truly ‘needed’ to get married, since 
their chances of gaining their domestic autonomy as single women remain at unattractive 
levels. 
The Residential Autonomy of Couples 
Couples too do not show any clear tendency toward an increasing ratio of 
residential autonomy (Tables 4.4 and 4.5). So much for the nuclearization of the HJH in 
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Maharashtra. From 1993 to 2004, there was even a sharp diminution of the residential 
and domestic autonomy of younger couples, a trend we could broadly correlate with the 
early stages of population ageing. Life expectancy in Maharashtra went from 60.7 years 
old at the beginning of the 1980s, to 66.9 years old at the beginning of the 2000s 
(Registrar General 2010), which means that kartas can now hope to hold onto their 
superordinate position for a slightly longer period
20. More importantly, Maharashtra’s 
total fertility rate declined steadily over the last three decades: it went from 4.3 children 
per woman in 1971-75, to 3.4 in 1986-90 and to 2.3 in 2001-05 (ibid.). Even if we take 
declining sex ratios and population inertia into account, this means that couples became 
more and more likely to have only one son. Since we know that parents with only one son 
are very unlikely to partition living arrangements with him and that older MRUs usually 
retain their superordinate position in such cohabitation (Shah 1998d: 89-90), it comes as 
no surprise to see younger couples being less and less autonomous in residential and 
domestic matters. To put it more prosaically, in some circumstances, it appears that a 
young man’s best chance at obtaining his residential and/or domestic autonomy was to 
have a younger brother; parents would allow the former to leave the family house as long 
as the latter was forced to remain with them, that is, was forced to care for them as they 
grew older. Nowadays, because of fertility decline in Maharashtra and in most of India, 
this young man’s ‘best chance’ occurs less frequently. 
Had we been left only with economic explanations to account for it, this decline in 
residential and domestic autonomy would have appeared all the more surprising given 
                                                          
20
 However, it might have been that this increase in life expectancy is attributable to gains in mortality at 
younger ages. To ascertain the effect of the rise in life expectancy on the karta’s force, we would need to 
measure the increase in life expectancy at, say, 50 years old. As the data on morality remains rather scarce 
in Maharashtra, we were not able to measure this indicator. 
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India’s serious economic crisis around the year 1991, which was followed by economic 
transformations and relatively high levels of economic growth for the rest of the decade 
(Etienne 2006)
21
. In comparison, loneship ratios in Canada went up for all MRUs during 
the 1970s, a period of favourable economic climate, whereas they declined for some 
MRUs at the beginning of the 1980s, a period of economic difficulties (again, relatively 
speaking) marked by an important recession in 1982 (Verdon 1998: 156-160). The 
absence of such correlation in Maharashtra merely tells us that, when explaining trends in 
domestic and residential autonomy in India, there are other factors at play than just trends 
in per capita income. 
 
 
Table 4.4 – Residential Autonomy of Couples (MRU4-MRU5) by Age Group, Maharashtra 1983-
2004 (weighted %) 
Age 1983 1987 1993 1999 2004 Average 
Less than 25 14,82 14,69 23,61 21,60 19,90 18,92 
25-29 31,60 31,30 40,11 38,56 33,44 35,00 
30-34 46,75 48,79 54,16 54,68 45,77 50,03 
35-39 60,27 63,89 64,29 62,04 57,35 61,57 
40-44 66,18 66,33 71,67 65,35 68,07 67,52 
45-49 55,03 58,61 59,99 53,60 53,73 56,19 
50-54 41,52 39,14 37,37 34,24 30,86 36,63 
55-59 32,08 27,80 28,55 26,35 24,57 27,87 
60-64 30,61 28,05 26,10 22,29 25,31 26,47 
65-69 23,19 30,67 32,15 29,90 26,95 28,57 
70+ 25,34 25,88 24,27 22,77 30,91 25,83 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
 
  
                                                          
21
 However, it also seems that housing prices fluctuated heavily in Mumbai during the 1990s, a fact not 
short of repercussions for the rest of the state (Nijman 2000). 
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Table 4.5 – Domestic Autonomy of Couples (MRU4-MRU5) by Age Group, Maharashtra 1983-
2004 (weighted %) 
Age 1983 1987 1993 1999 2004 Average 
Less than 25 26,37 27,26 34,57 33,83 29,15 30,24 
25-29 51,67 48,79 57,82 54,81 48,64 52,35 
30-34 73,34 70,25 74,04 71,70 64,98 70,86 
35-39 86,11 87,26 87,12 81,27 77,76 83,90 
40-44 92,49 93,48 93,17 89,24 89,93 91,66 
45-49 96,09 97,05 96,42 94,88 93,99 95,69 
50-54 96,53 96,75 96,19 96,36 95,85 96,34 
55-59 96,54 96,49 97,38 95,22 96,35 96,40 
60-64 93,51 94,51 93,08 89,13 92,91 92,63 
65-69 93,73 90,35 90,48 88,43 87,01 90,00 
70+ 82,18 77,32 79,66 81,45 80,63 80,25 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
 
 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Less
than 25
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70+
R
at
io
 o
f 
re
si
d
e
n
ti
al
 o
r 
d
o
m
e
st
ic
 a
u
to
n
o
m
y 
(w
e
ig
h
te
d
 %
) 
Age group 
Figure 4.2 - Residential and Domestic Autonomy of Couples (MRU4-
MRU5, on average) by Age Group, Maharashtra 1983-2004 (weighted %) 
Residential Autonomy Domestic Autonomy
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Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
Furthermore, we can observe that variations of these two ratios during a couple’s 
lifetime, on average, are much greater than they were for single adults (Figure 4.2). We 
have to wait until the husband is aged between 30 and 35 years old to see a majority of 
couples becoming residentially autonomous. The peak of residential autonomy for 
couples comes when the husband is in the 40-44 age group. Afterward, the decrease in 
residential autonomy is accompanied by an increase in domestic autonomy, which means 
that couples generally became superordinate members in a complex household ‘of their 
own’. 
As expected, there are important differences between couples with dependent 
children (MRU5) and couples without dependent children (MRU4)(Figure 4.3). The 
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Figure 4.3 - Residential and Domestic Autonomy of MRU4 and MRU5 (on 
average) by Age Group, Maharashtra 1983-2004 (weighted %) 
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former type has a higher ratio of domestic and residential autonomy at all ages under 70 
years, after which the number of MRU5 starts to decline substantially and to yield more 
inconsistent results. Interestingly, there is a gap of approximately five years between the 
average moments at which 50% of MRU5 and MRU4 reached their residential autonomy, 
a difference that reflects the influence of a centrifugal pull we previously uncovered. This 
pull was observed when young men, as soon as they became fathers, also became more 
affirmative in their desire for residential autonomy. In addition, the socialization of the 
children in a complex household is said to be an important cause of dispute, potentially 
leading to residential partition (Shah 1998d: 85). We can finally observe that old couples 
who still have dependent children under their supervision may continue to coreside with 
their other adult children in a complex household, but rarely become subordinate 
members in it.  
In summary, the absence of a steady upward trend in loneship ratios over a period 
of twenty years supports the idea that there was no nuclearization of households in 
Maharashtra in the last half-century. As suggested in the introduction, but as can now be 
ascertained with more precise indicators, it seems we are rather witnessing a situation of 
relative stability of the HJH combined with a decrease in the residential and domestic 
autonomy of younger couples. This also means that young couples are increasingly living 
in complex households with a downward vector of power relationships. Hence, it 
becomes ever so pertinent to ask: why and how do complex households still endure in the 
context of modern Maharashtra? 
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4.3.2 The Determinants of Residential Autonomy 
Method 
Now comes the time to evaluate if the centrifugal pulls, forces and hindrances we 
described in the qualitative section can actually explain trends in residential autonomy in 
Maharashtra between 1983 and 2004. To this end, we specified two main models to 
maximize the use we could make of all observations in the five rounds of the NSS. Both 
models use logistic regressions because the dependant variable, the loneship ratio (we 
will also call it a ratio of residential autonomy), is dichotomous; both are solely 
concerned with MRU4 and MRU5 (couples), for which we possess the highest number of 
observations; and both are divided into several ‘sub-models’ in order to assess the 
robustness of our regression estimates. 
In the first main model, we used all five NSS rounds but could only consider the 
effects of the centrifugal pulls and hindrances; we had to leave forces aside because of 
the impossibility to harmonize their associated variables across all samples. We pooled 
the data from the five surveys into a combined sample and used dummy variables 
associated with each survey to assess time trends in residential autonomy, and also to 
crudely capture for differences between the surveys’ questionnaires and definitions. This 
first main model is itself divided into two sub-models. 
In the second main model, we compared the effects of pulls, hindrances and 
forces altogether, but only for the years 1983 and 1999. We used data from these two 
surveys to estimate four separate sub-models. The first two sub-models merge the data 
from the 1983-1999 surveys into one sample, and addresses how the inclusion of forces 
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in the regression influenced the other independent variables. The last two sub-models 
offer regressions using the same variables, but this time for the 1983 survey and the 1999 
survey separately (in order to depict the dynamism of the determinants of residential 
autonomy). By definition, the effects of our centrifugal pulls, forces and hindrances are 
not historically static: they change over time and we need to verify if and how these 
transformations are measurable. 
Variables 
In order to account for regional variations, we use dichotomous variables on the 
MRUs’ region in Maharashtra and rural/urban location (Table 4.6). As previously 
mentioned, we view regional diversity as a most crucial issue in the Indian context. 
Consequently, our first sub-model provides regression estimates only for the survey 
dummies and these geographical variables; the results of this sub-model give us a broad 
picture of spatial and temporal variations in residential autonomy in Maharashtra. In 
addition, to take issues of religion and caste diversity into account, the last five sub-
models all include a series of dichotomous variables on religious affiliation (Table 4.6). 
To measure the effects of the centrifugal pulls, we used the husband’s age as a 
proxy of MRUs’ desire for economic autonomy, the wife’s age as a proxy of MRUs’ 
desire for domestic autonomy, and a dichotomous variable on the presence of a 
dependent child as a proxy of the effect of having a dependent child on couples’ desire 
for residential autonomy (Tables 4.7 to 4.9). However, one must not necessarily take 
these proxies at face value; age was our best proxy of centrifugal pulls, but also correlates 
with a host of other factors associated to a MRU’s bargaining power inside the 
household, some of which simply relate to personal maturation. In this regard, we 
included an ‘age-squared’ variable since we also anticipate that the effect if aging will be 
non-linear. 
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Table 4.6 – Location and Religious Affiliation of Couples (MRU4-MRU5), Maharashtra 1983-
2004 
   
1983 1987 1993 1999 2004 
        
% Urban (weighted %) 32,15 31,75 36,04 36,94 38,94 
Missing/Unknown 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
        
Region (weighted %) 
     
Coastal 
  
20,32 19,38 22,21 23,96 22,75 
Inland Western 
 
25,60 26,75 26,63 26,59 25,85 
Inland Northern 
 
12,40 12,32 12,23 11,88 12,16 
Inland Central 
 
16,92 17,55 16,94 15,69 17,49 
Inland Eastern 
 
17,68 17,92 16,39 16,13 16,07 
Eastern 
  
7,08 6,09 5,60 5,76 5,69 
Missing/Unknown 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
        
Religion (weighted %) 
     
Buddhist 
  
5,99 5,25 6,55 5,7 6,18 
Hindu 
  
83,28 84,05 83,11 82,55 83,07 
Muslim 
  
7,72 7,81 7,72 8,69 8,44 
Christian 
  
1,09 0,66 0,91 1,1 1,05 
Other 
  
1,92 2,14 1,71 1,95 1,25 
Missing/Unknown 
 
0 0,094 0 0 0 
        
Number of Couples (without weights) 10 404 11 801 9 974 9 764 10 786 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
We measured the effect of hindrances using dichotomous variables on the 
spouses’ attained educational level and on their occupation, that is, on whether they were 
i) ‘household workers’ or unemployed, ii) casual salaried workers or iii) regular salaried 
workers (Table 4.11). We were not able to include a variable on current attendance in 
school; since our samples are composed almost exclusively of people over 21 years old, 
this omission could cause a downward bias in the estimation of the residential autonomy 
of university students, though controls for age and economic activity might well 
minimize this possible bias. Finally, when available, we used a variable on the size of the 
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land cultivated (whether this land was leased-in, owned, etc.), which we divided into 
quartiles (Table 4.10). We viewed this variable as a proxy of the karta’s force, and thus 
we associated an increasing land size with an increasing ability, on the part of the karta, 
to ensure the coresidence of two or more MRUs in a complex household. 
Table 4.7 – Age Distribution of Wives, Maharashtra 1983-2004 (weighted %) 
Age 1983 1987 1993 1999 2004 Average 
Less than 25 25,19 23,02 19,41 16,73 15,61 19,99 
25-29 16,37 16,59 16,38 16,95 15,41 16,34 
30-34 12,60 13,76 15,09 15,86 14,93 14,45 
35-39 13,07 12,81 13,52 14,31 14,59 13,66 
40-44 9,75 9,98 10,02 9,90 10,81 10,09 
45-49 8,85 8,76 9,03 8,25 8,95 8,77 
50-54 6,22 6,37 6,20 6,49 5,96 6,25 
55-59 4,04 4,45 4,98 4,60 5,28 4,67 
60-64 2,12 2,37 3,00 3,72 4,03 3,05 
65-69 1,06 1,18 1,50 2,05 2,85 1,73 
70+ 0,72 0,70 0,90 1,14 1,59 1,01 
Missing/Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
Table 4.8 – Age Distribution of Husbands, Maharashtra 1983-2004 (weighted %) 
Age 1983 1987 1993 1999 2004 Average 
Less than 25 8,89 7,07 5,48 4,43 4,34 6,04 
25-29 14,28 14,44 12,72 12,33 11,12 12,98 
30-34 13,88 14,79 15,67 15,57 14,61 14,90 
35-39 13,30 14,46 14,85 15,49 14,73 14,57 
40-44 12,06 10,93 12,06 13,60 13,71 12,47 
45-49 11,16 11,35 11,15 10,26 11,09 11,00 
50-54 8,07 8,51 8,19 8,35 8,31 8,29 
55-59 6,88 7,03 6,91 6,17 6,44 6,69 
60-64 5,20 5,33 5,81 4,93 5,28 5,31 
65-69 3,27 3,02 3,67 4,66 5,01 3,93 
70+ 3,01 3,07 3,50 4,19 5,35 3,82 
Missing/Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
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Table 4.9 – Couples (MRU4-MRU5) With At Least One Child, Maharashtra 1983-2004 
   1983 1987 1993 1999 2004 
        
Couples With At Least  
One Child (weighted %) 
76,76 77,00 75,77 74,33 70,34 
Missing/Unknown 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
        
Number of Couples (without weights) 10 404 11 801 9 974 9 764 10 786 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
 
Table 4.10 – Socioeconomic Characteristics of Couples (MRU4-MRU5), Forces (landholding), 
Maharashtra 1983-2004 
   1983 1987 1993 1999 2004 
 
  
     
Landholding (weighted %) 
     
No Landholding  27,68 n/a n/a 27,83 n/a 
1st Quartile  20,03 n/a n/a 26,62 n/a 
2nd Quartile  13,02 n/a n/a 5,01 n/a 
3rd Quartile  19,87 n/a n/a 23,82 n/a 
4th Quartile  19,41 n/a n/a 16,71 n/a 
Missing/Unknown  0,00 n/a n/a 0,00 n/a 
 
  
     
Number of couples (without weights) 10 404 11 801 9 974 9 764 10 786 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
 
Some Preliminary Considerations and Hypotheses 
The effect of the spouses’ education on residential autonomy is particularly hard 
to assess. Our main objective in this regard was to interpret education as a modality of a 
MRU’s ‘bargaining power’ inside the household (assuming that more bargaining power 
inside the household makes it more likely for a given MRU to attain residential autonomy 
or at least to prevent domestic subordination). On the one hand, we could hypothesize 
that an increase in spouses’ education would foster an increased bargaining power of 
their MRUs. For example, a son might be more likely to challenge his father’s authority  
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Table 4.11 – Socioeconomic Characteristics of Couples (MRU4-MRU5), Hindrances (education 
and economic activity), Maharashtra 1983-2004 
   1983 1987 1993 1999 2004 
        
Husband's Education (weighted %)     
Illiterate 
  
35,77 34,06 29,47 24,72 22,02 
Literate, less than primary 12,13 13,46 13,21 11,67 10,02 
Primary 
  
22,08 20,07 15,78 14,25 13,92 
Middle 
  
13,16 12,24 17,69 18,89 20,94 
Secondary 
 
12,50 14,98 16,92 21,49 19,51 
Undergraduate or Graduate 4,29 5,19 6,92 8,84 13,59 
Missing/Unknown 
 
0,06 0,01 0,01 0,14 0,00 
   
     
Wife's Education (weighted %)     
Illiterate 
  
65,48 61,75 53,00 44,36 39,35 
Literate, less than primary 6,41 8,46 8,91 8,08 7,97 
Primary 
  
13,44 13,19 12,37 14,27 12,93 
Middle 
  
7,08 7,04 12,41 15,88 18,94 
Secondary 
 
5,93 7,34 9,75 12,56 13,20 
Undergraduate or Graduate 1,63 2,22 3,51 4,76 7,62 
Missing/Unknown 
 
0,03 0,00 0,04 0,09 0,00 
   
     
Husband's Economic Activity (weighted %)    
Unemployed or Working Home 49,71 47,85 47,80 46,36 53,71 
Casual Wage Labor 
 
25,49 27,03 27,36 28,42 24,03 
Regular Wage Labor 24,80 25,12 24,84 25,22 22,27 
Missing/Unknown 
 
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
   
     
Wife's Economic Activity (weighted %)     
Unemployed or Working Home 71,36 72,79 72,69 74,33 74,86 
Casual Wage Labor 
 
26,44 23,74 23,93 22,60 20,83 
Regular Wage Labor 2,19 3,47 3,38 3,07 4,31 
Missing/Unknown 
 
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
   
     
Number of couples (without weights) 10 404 11 801 9 974 9 764 10 786 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
if he knows that his education can procure him a job outside the family network. Such a 
relation was suggested by Caldwell et al. in Karnataka (1988: 112), though it seems its 
effect was marginal after controlling for the size of the family’s landholding (129). On 
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the other hand, it may be the case that even the most educated MRUs remain dependent 
on the karta’s network and approval to find a job, in which case higher education will not 
be accompanied by an increasing bargaining power in intra-household dynamics. 
Similarly, it is also likely that the education variable captures some effect of class or caste 
membership. 
The effect of spouses’ occupation can be interpreted more straightforwardly. We 
mentioned in the previous section that income diversification within the household 
generally had a positive effect on the residential autonomy of subordinated MRUs, since 
it prevented (to a certain extent) the karta’s ability to pool their incomes in the household 
common budget. Accordingly, we make the hypothesis that salaried workers have a better 
chance to gain their residential autonomy than household workers or unemployed 
workers. We hypothesize that the absence of an independent source of income hinders the 
ability of subordinate MRUs to acquire the necessary resources to eventually form a 
viable household of their own. Ram and Wong (1994) discovered that a rising individual 
income had a negative effect on the chances of belonging to a complex household. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to include an independent variable on income because of 
the format of the variable in all the NSS. In the surveys, individuals were asked about 
their income for a given week in the year. Because of the importance of seasonal labor in 
India and in Maharashtra, we viewed this indicator as too fluctuating, and thus unable to 
render a clear picture of a MRU’s income throughout a longer period (say, a year), which 
is actually the pertinent information to assess a MRUs bargaining power inside a complex 
household. 
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In their longitudinal study of villages of semi-arid tropical regions, some of which 
were situated in Maharashtra, Ram and Wong also observed that “large farm households 
were twice as likely to be extended [complex] compared with landless households” in 
1976, and seven times more likely in 1984 (1994: 860). Caldwell et al. found a positive 
relation between the size of a family’s landholdings and the presence of complex 
households, and thought that the relation would grow in intensity because of new 
legislations on land ceilings (1988: 129-130). However, they also wrote that sons were, at 
the end of the 1970s, “less dependent on the fathers’ land or trade for employment” 
(1988: 248). For our part, we also make the hypothesis that larger landholdings will be 
positively associated with the presence of complex households but, taking Caldwell et 
al.’s last argument into account, we do not believe that this relation will continue to 
increase in intensity over the 20 years covered by the NSS samples. 
The many hindrances we uncovered in our qualitative portrait restricted the sons’ 
ability to accumulate the necessary resources to form a household of their own while their 
father was still alive. Those hindrances, however, were rarely important enough to 
compel married brothers to live together after the death of the father. Verdon wrote that 
one could detect that hindrances operated in absence of forces “when MRUs leave home 
soon after marriage, or return home after having been residentially autonomous” (1998: 
68). As such trajectory is not alluded to in ethnographic descriptions, and in the near 
absence of the coresidence of married brothers after the death of their father, we finally 
make the hypothesis that, apart from aging, the effect of variables associated with forces 
will be more important on residential autonomy in Maharashtra than the effect of 
variables associated with hindrances. 
  
Table 4.12 - Logistic Regression of Determinants of Residential Autonomy (without forces), Maharashtra 1983-2004 (odds ratios) 
 
   Control Variables Full Model Without Forces 
Demographic   
  
 
Husband's Age  
 
1,159*** 
 
(Husband's Age)^2  
 
0,999*** 
 
Wife's Age  
 
1,054* 
 
(Wife's Age)^2  
 
0,999*** 
 
Having Dependent Child(ren) 
 
2,052*** 
Year (Reference: 1983)  
  
 
1987   1,427*** 1,420*** 
 
1993   1,581*** 1,623*** 
 
1999   1,525*** 1,582*** 
 
2004   1,333*** 1,497*** 
Location (Reference: Rural)  
  
 
Urban   1,124*** 1,094* 
Region (Reference: Coastal)  
  
 
Inland Western  0,856*** 0,907* 
 
Inland Northern  0,910 0,909 
 
Inland Central  0,922 0,975 
 
Inland Eastern  1,207*** 1,180*** 
 
Eastern   1,045 1,016 
Religion (Reference Hindu)  
  
 
Buddhist   
 
0,960 
 
Muslim   
 
0,945 
 
Christian   
 
1,214 
 
Other   
 
0,997 
Husband's Education (Reference: Illiterate)  
 
Literate, less than primary 
 
0,867** 
 
Primary   
 
0,822*** 
 
Middle   
 
0,770*** 
 
Secondary  
 
0,804*** 
 
Undergraduate or Graduate 
 
0,847* 
Wife's Education (Reference: Illiterate) 
  
 
Literate, less than primary 
 
1,027 
 
Primary   
 
0,957 
 
Middle   
 
0,872** 
 
Secondary  
 
0,909 
 
Undergraduate or Graduate 
 
0,982 
Husband's Economic Activity (Reference: Unemployed or Working Home) 
 
Casual Salaried Work 
 
1,760*** 
 
Regular Salaried Work 
 
1,776*** 
Wife's Economic Activity (Reference: Unemployed or Working Home) 
 
Casual Salaried Work 
 
1,337*** 
 
Regular Salaried Work 
 
1,212* 
    
Sample Size   49 578 49 578 
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Number of households  31 240 31 240 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
Notes: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
  
Table 4.13 - Logistic Regression of Determinants of Residential Autonomy (full model), Maharashtra 1983 and 1999 (odds ratios) 
    1983-1999 - Full Model Without Forces 1983-1999 - Full Model 1983 - Full Model 1999 - Full Model 
Demographic 
 
 
    
 
Husband's Age  1,178*** 1,169*** 1,168*** 1,191*** 
 
(Husband's Age)^2  0,999*** 0,999*** 0,999*** 0,998*** 
 
Wife's Age  1,030 1,051 1,099* 1,000 
 
(Wife's Age)^2  0,999* 0,999** 0,998*** 0,999 
 
Having Dependent Child(ren) 2,097*** 2,150*** 1,664*** 2,496*** 
Year (Reference: 1983)  
    
 
1999 
 
 1,565*** 1,610*** 
  
Location (Reference: Rural)  
    
 
Urban 
 
 1,088 0,617*** 0,578*** 0,644*** 
Region (Reference: Coastal)  
    
 
Inland Western  0,952 1,148 0,987 1,290* 
 
Inland Northern  0,930 1,106 1,059 1,159 
 
Inland Central  1,028 1,452*** 1,282* 1,578*** 
 
Inland Eastern  1,125 1,538*** 1,520*** 1,586*** 
 
Eastern 
 
 1,137 1,492*** 1,503** 1,492** 
Religion (Reference Hindu)  
    
 
Buddhist 
 
 0,879 1,017 0,834 1,174 
 
Muslim 
 
 0,834 0,804 0,685* 0,902 
 
Christian 
 
 1,048 1,066 0,615 1,584 
 
Other 
 
 0,888 0,929 0,699 1,081 
Husband's Education (Reference: Illiterate)    
 
Literate, less than primary 0,915 0,938 1,085 0,831 
 
Primary 
 
 0,815** 0,835** 0,893 0,797* 
 
Middle 
 
 0,741*** 0,764*** 0,898 0,688*** 
 
Secondary  0,772** 0,797** 0,879 0,731** 
 
Undergraduate or Graduate 0,808 0,862 1,030 0,765 
Wife's Education (Reference: Illiterate) 
    
 
Literate, less than primary 1,054 1,032 1,023 1,031 
 
Primary 
 
 0,992 0,974 0,927 0,988 
 
Middle 
 
 0,978 0,937 1,097 0,858 
 
Secondary  1,055 0,969 1,063 0,916 
 
Undergraduate or Graduate 1,071 0,952 0,952 0,973 
Husband's Economic Activity (Reference: Unemployed or Working Home)  
 
Casual Salaried Work 1,884*** 1,410*** 1,386*** 1,409*** 
 
Regular Salaried Work 1,641*** 1,254*** 1,361*** 1,197* 
Wife's Economic Activity (Reference: Unemployed or Working Home)   
 
Casual Salaried Work 1,276*** 1,028 1,081 0,978 
 
Regular Salaried Work 1,258 1,164 1,047 1,215 
Household Land (Reference: Landless) 
    
 
1st Quartile  
 
0,702*** 0,622*** 0,751** 
 
2nd Quartile  
 
0,464*** 0,470*** 0,442*** 
 
3rd Quartile  
 
0,358*** 0,329*** 0,380*** 
 
4th Quartile  
 
0,192*** 0,163*** 0,213*** 
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Sample Size 
 
 19 169 19 169 10 152 9 017 
Number of Households  14 781 14 781 8 246 7 488 
Source: National Sample Surveys (NSS) #38-#43-#50-#55-#60, made available by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). 
Notes: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001  
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Findings 
Table 4.12 presents the odds ratios of a model comprising the MRU4 and MRU5 
of all five rounds of the NSS, but which does not include forces in its set of independent 
variables (which were only available for two rounds of the NSS). In both the first and the 
second sub-model, trends in the residential autonomy of couples follow our previous 
observations: even when controlling for more geographic and socioeconomic variables, 
we can see that the peak of residential autonomy for couples came around the year 1993, 
and that ratios of residential autonomy declined from that year up to 2004. This finding 
provides additional support for our hypothesis on the effect of fertility decline on MRU 
interactions in Maharashtra. The results of both sub-models also show significant 
regional variations across the state, as well as an urban advantage in residential 
autonomy; however, the inclusion of pulls, forces and hindrances in the second sub-
model reduces the statistical significance of this urban advantage. Differences in 
residential autonomy between religious groups are not statistically significant. 
Regarding centrifugal pulls, an increase in the husband’s age is seen to have a 
more important positive effect on the residential autonomy of couples than an increase in 
the wife’s age. In this model, ‘aging’ reaches its peak positive effect when men are aged 
59 and when women are aged 21: this fact could be interpreted as meaning that men’s 
pull for economic autonomy has a more durable and decisive influence on residential 
autonomy than women’s pull for domestic autonomy. As expected, we also find that the 
estimated odds of being residentially autonomous are more than two times higher for 
MRU5 than for MRU4. 
The effect of the spouses’ education continues to be somewhat puzzling. For 
instance, men who have completed their middle-school are less likely to be residentially 
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autonomous than either men who have completed their secondary school or those who 
have completed only primary school. If we assume that husbands with a lower level of 
education belong to lower classes and castes, especially among illiterates, the negative 
effect of literacy should reflect the weak bargaining power of superordinate MRUs 
among poor sections of the society (i.e. poor fathers’ inability to entice their married sons 
to subordinate coresidence). Accordingly, the fact that a husband’s college education is 
positively related with residential autonomy in comparison with any level education from 
primary school onwards could reflect the fact that education matters more on the 
residential autonomy of couples among middle or higher classes. The same could be said 
about the effect of the wife’s education, as college level education for the wife is even 
more closely associated with residential autonomy than a college education for the 
husband, although variations in the wife’s education cause a lesser variation on the 
residential autonomy of couples than variations in the husband’s education. This would 
confirm the notion that women’s education, in Maharashtra and perhaps in most of India, 
is not the best indicator of a women’s autonomy in everyday life (Das Gupta 1990; Ram 
& Wong 1994: 860; Jejeebhoy & Zathar 2001). 
The second sub-model of Table 4.12 also shows that, all other things being equal, 
MRUs whose members work in casual or salaried jobs are significantly more likely to 
obtain their residential autonomy than MRUs whose members work in the family 
household or are unemployed. This observation is consistent with Shah’s hypothesis on 
the effect of income diversification on residential partition. The estimated effect is more 
important with the work of husbands than with that of wives, although the influence of 
casual salaried work on residential autonomy is almost equal to that of regular salaried 
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work among men, while it is higher among women. Since we were unable to control for 
incomes in the regression, this relation may indicate that wages in Maharashtra are often 
simply too low to allow simultaneously for residential autonomy and acceptable 
standards of living. If true, this would provide another evidence of the value of land as a 
means for independence in India (Agarwal 1994). 
As mentioned earlier, the main model in Table 4.13 incorporates couple data from 
the 1983 and 1999 surveys only, but also includes forces in its set of independent 
variables (whereas the main model in Table 4.12 did not). Accordingly, only a quick look 
at the first two sub-models of Table 4.13 is sufficient to question the robustness or 
stability of some of our estimates in Table 4.12. Notably, we can see that the 
dichotomous variable on urban location changes from having a positive effect on 
residential autonomy in Table 4.12 to having a non-significant or a negative effect in 
Table 4.13. Maharashtra being the third most urbanized state in India, this observation 
further undermines Goode’s hypothesis on the influence of urbanization on the 
nuclearization of Indian households (1970: 203-269). As previously suggested, we might 
be able to explain this negative relation with a better assessment of the effects of 
population density and temporary migration in Maharashtra’s towns. We can also see that 
geographical variations became more important in the second sub-model in Table 4.13: 
when controlling for landholding, a contrast emerges between the eastern and western 
regions of Maharashtra. On the other hand, this second sub-model still shows no 
statistically significant variations between religious affiliations. 
Another important modification brought about by the inclusion of forces concerns 
the influence of gender. In all the sub-models which included landholding as an 
80 
 
 
independent variable, women’s education and occupation has no significant effect on the 
residential autonomy of couples. Moreover, the effect of increasing age for a wife 
contributed positively to the residential autonomy of couples in 1983 (the third sub-model 
of Table 4.13, where the positive effect of aging peaked at 27 years old for women and at 
59 years old for men) but otherwise had a null or negative effect. Once again, this echoes 
the literature on the great vulnerability of widows and in-marrying wives in Western 
India. 
But perhaps the most important finding in Table 4.13 pertains to the pivotal 
influence of landholding, which we view as proxy of the karta’s force. According to the 
second sub-model in this table, belonging to a household that cultivated land reduced 
couples’ odds of being residentially autonomous by at least 30% Let us be even more 
precise. In both the 1983 and the 1999 survey, all landholdings of the first quartile 
covered an area of at most one hectare. This means that during the years covered by both 
samples, when controlling for other variables, the odds of being residentially autonomous 
are estimated to be at least 50% lower for a couple belonging to a household owning 
more than one hectare of land (roughly 50% of couples in both samples (Table 4.10)) in 
comparison with couples belonging to a landless household. This provides a striking 
illustration of the karta’s strength when he is able to use land as leverage in his 
relationships with his sons. These results corroborate our hypothesis that, apart from ‘life 
cycle variables’ (age and the custody of children), the effect of forces is more important 
than the effect of hindrances in determining the residential autonomy of couples in 
Maharashtra. 
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The last two sub-models in Table 4.13 can be compared to take into account 
changes in the determinants of residential autonomy over time. In view of that, we can 
see that the effect of land has slightly lessened from 1983 to 1999 (the odd ratios are 
closer to one), with the exception of landholdings in the second quartile. This decline is 
not associated with a clear rise in the effect of spouses’ education nor spouses’ 
occupation, but is associated with a rise in the effect of the husbands’ age and in the 
effect of the custody of dependent children. It is not clear whether this means that sons’ 
bargaining power inside the household increased. Perhaps it tells us that the karta’s force 
now expresses itself differently. We believe that the slight reduction in the effect of 
landholdings could partly be attributable to a rise in the importance of another variable 
which was unfortunately omitted in the NSS samples: the number of sons (or brothers). If 
superordinate MRUs were certainly advantaged in possessing a large amount of land if 
they wished to maintain cohabitation with all their married sons, Shah wrote that 
“ownership of property would not be an issue in the relationship between parents and 
their only son […]; management of emotions and feelings would be the central issue” 
(1998d: 90). Though he might have overstated his point, Shah suggests that land may not 
always be the main reason behind the subordinate coresidence of an only son. Among 
other factors, we need to consider the age at marriage for men who have no brothers and 
the choice of the bride by the parental couple. The last two sub-models of Table 4.13 also 
showed important changes in the effect of religious affiliation (Muslims are no longer 
different than Hindus in terms of residential autonomy), urban residence and the 
husband’s education. 
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Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this thesis was to provide an theoretical and statistical 
application of Michel Verdon’s atomistic perspective for the study of households in 
India, more precisely in Western India and Maharashtra. We can confirm that this 
application already yielded an advanced reinterpretation of ethnographic descriptions, a 
reinterpretation which was coherent from a theoretical standpoint and which also brought 
forth quantifiable propositions about household formation and composition in 
Maharashtra. 
By adopting Michel Verdon’s fundamental social-psychological axiom and 
adapting its corollaries to the Indian context, we reversed the terms of the traditional 
collectivistic representation of the Indian household; moving beyond usual explanations 
of the fission of complex households in India, we centered our analysis on factors 
accounting for their stability and thereby developed novel measurements and hypotheses 
on the so-called nuclearization of the HJH. One could even argue that the factors 
accounting for the presence of complex households in Western India (lack of financial 
independence of young couples, the management of household budget and family 
property by the karta, the age at marriage, fluctuations in employment and incomes, 
housing prices, materials and skills for building a house, etc.) appear easier to quantify 
than factors explaining their fission (the ambivalent ‘developmental process’ argument, 
the rising individualism among younger generations, the westernization of family values, 
etc.). In other words, the ethnological intuition entailed by our new set of axioms turned 
out to be an opportunity of synthesizing qualitative descriptions and quantitative 
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measurements into an integrated model on household formation and composition in 
Maharashtra. 
With residential autonomy now the crux of the matter, and using Ermisch and 
Overton’s MRUs and loneship ratios, we corroborated the views of the many authors who 
contended that there was no nuclearization of households in India (and Western India) 
and that there might even be a rise in the proportion of complex households (e.g. Shah 
2005; Uberoi 1993; Caldwell et al. 1988; Conklin 1974; Orenstein 1961). Despite a 
favorable economic context, we observed a rise in the residential and domestic 
subordination of young Maharashtrian couples from 1993 to 2004, a situation we 
attributed in great part to fertility decline. 
With regard to the determinants of the residential autonomy of couples, the use of 
multivariate regression analysis allowed us to determine that ‘life cycle factors’ (age and 
the custody of a dependent child) remained among the best predictors of a couple’s 
residential autonomy. In addition, we noted that factors associated with the characteristics 
of the husband induced greater variability in the residential autonomy of couples than 
factors associated with the characteristics of the wife. The variations in the loneship ratios 
of single adults suggested a similar gender differentiation. And when the data was 
available to measure forces as well as hindrances, all other things equal, we saw that the 
effect of factors associated with the karta’s force (landholding) were more important than 
the effect of factors associated with socioeconomic hindrances (education and 
employment). These findings were consistent with several propositions previously 
detailed in our qualitative portrait of the household in Western India. 
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Yet, these statistical results must also be treated with caution. Since many crucial 
variables potentially related to our atomistic model were not available in the NSS 
samples (e.g. the health status of individuals, sibship size, age at marriage, income, etc.), 
further investigation with different data sets is needed to specify or ascertain some of the 
associations we uncovered. Furthermore, we abide by many of the clarifications made by 
Blossfeld et al. on cross-sectional observation (2007: 5-13). For instance, it may happen 
that the net effect of a given variable in our model(s) conceals two opposite and 
counteracting effects (like we suggested with education), so that a non-significant 
coefficient (odds ratio) may in fact hide two statistically significant associations. 
Likewise, Blossfeld et al. wrote that “[c]ross-sectional data cannot be used to distinguish 
age and cohort effects” (2007: 9); this limitation may undermine our interpretation of the 
effects of ‘life cycle factors’ and, incidentally, our interpretation of trends in ratios of 
residential autonomy between 1983 and 2004. As we mentioned, these trends mostly 
pertain to analyses on punctual settings in household composition and remain rather 
imprecise as to the evolution of patterns of household formation. Nevertheless, the 
variables we used and our proposed approach for linking their coefficients to ethnological 
theory can still open the way for similar modeling with better adjusted data; the use of 
longitudinal data might even lead to definitive solutions on some of the problems 
outlined above. Besides, had we been confined to collectivistic formulations or to a dual 
set of axioms, we might simply have been unable to attain such a degree of 
complementarity between our theoretical and quantitative specifications. 
The few exhaustive statistical models on household composition and/or formation 
in India (most notably Ram and Wong 1994; Niranjan et al. 2005) were not elaborated on 
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atomistic premises and yielded ambivalent measurements and explanations of the 
phenomena under study. They drew no distinctions between factors influencing family 
formation and household formation (between MRU formation and interaction), nor 
between adult and dependent children, omissions which undermined the relevance of 
some of their independent variables and blurred their delineations of household types. 
But more important is the fact that these studies were trapped in some form of axiomatic 
dualism, and thereby displayed a lack of complementarity between their ethnological and 
statistical interpretations. For instance, Niranjan et al. wrote that residence in an urban 
area promoted ‘urban culture’ and a predilection for living in nuclear households (2005: 
629), but noted on the opposite that “as the cost of living tends to be higher in the cities, 
individuals [residing in towns] are compelled [our emphasis] to live with their relatives” 
(2005: 646). If the first part of their statement suggests the presence of collectivistic 
postulates, This last part undoubtedly relies upon atomistic premises: it implies that if 
these individuals had not been ‘compelled’ (by socioeconomic hindrances) to coreside, 
they would have lived in simple households. In other words, they treated urbanization (a 
single dichotomous variable in their model) as a cause of both fission and permanence of 
complex households. Similarly, Ram and Wong interpreted a positive relation between 
the size of landholdings and household extension as meaning that “household extension 
was sought to facilitate the production process of families and to meet the manpower 
requirements of the production system” (1994: 863), but did not address the fact that the 
brothers invariably lived in separate households after the death of their father despite the 
loss of economies of scale, a situation unanimously highlighted in ethnographic accounts. 
Thus, if the model of Niranjan et al. suffered from contradictions in its statistical 
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interpretations in spite of pertinent ethnographic observations, we find that the model of 
Ram and Wong achieved a higher degree of statistical coherence at the cost ethnographic 
unawareness. 
Could this lack of integration between statistical and ethnological models be 
resolved with a plain collectivistic set of axioms? The most coherent collectivistic 
analyses on households in Western India were made before the proliferation of computers 
and statistical softwares, and were thus limited to descriptive statistics. Notably, the work 
of Shah is characterized by a large amount of statistical data on household composition 
and causes of residential partitions, with many subdivisions by castes and other 
socioeconomic variables; however, because unable to isolate the effects of cultural 
factors (e.g. caste membership) and socioeconomic factors (e.g. income, landholding), it 
lacks the very precision associated with multivariate regression analysis. 
Henceforth, instead of speculating about the statistical applicability of the 
collectivistic perspective (we prefer to leave this lengthy task to future inquiries), let us 
discuss some of the research opportunities propounded by the application of the atomistic 
perspective in India. More specifically, five research topics caught our attention. 
The first of these topics concerns the nature of family property in Maharashtra and 
Western India. To put it briefly, leaving aside gender issues and the distinction between 
ancestral property and self-acquired property, the ethnographic material available remains 
ambiguous as whether family property in Western India is corporate or individual. We 
know that sons gain their share in the family property by virtue of birth and retain this 
share until they die or partition, a feature typical of corporate ownership (Verdon 1998: 
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91-92). Conversely, even if he is not legally entitled to disinherit his son(s) (though 
Attwood discovered a case of older sons being ‘driven away’ and de facto disinherited), 
the karta seems to possess a paramount authority over the management of family 
property and thus exhibits many of the features of an individual owner. Hence, if family 
property is indeed corporate, how can we explain that sons tolerate such an asymmetry in 
their relationship with their father? Given our fundamental social-psychological axiom, 
how can we explain the pathways by which this asymmetry may indeed limit the sons’ 
autonomy in everyday activities? Could it be that family property in Western India defies 
traditional classifications of ownership types? We cannot overstate the need to gather 
more ethnographic data on property relationships between fathers and sons in Western 
India, and perhaps in India in general: solving this issue might lead us to refine 
definitions of centrifugal pulls, forces and hindrances related to landholdings. 
A second vein of research opportunities revolves around the topic of households 
in urban India. We already alluded to possible lines of inquiries on this subject at the end 
of our qualitative portrait, and the differences we found in our regression analyses 
between urban and rural areas (especially once we controlled for landholdings) only 
confirm the importance of this issue. Further research on the relation between population 
density (as a hindrance) and residential autonomy, since these two phenomena can be 
measured with great precision, may lead to innovative assessments of the effect of 
urbanization on households in the developing world, a question dating back to Goode’s 
(1970) seminal work. The impact of migration on residential autonomy in urban and rural 
Indian also calls for additional data; more particularly, we have in mind the study of the 
diverging residential corollaries of international migrations (labor migrations in the 
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Persian Gulf or the migration of skilled workers in Europe and North America, but also 
the impact of international remittances – e.g. Venier 2010; Sahay 2006; Dyson and 
Visaria 2004; Sahoo et al. 2001; Khadria 2001; Nair 1998; Shah 1998), internal 
migrations (particularly on issues of village exogamy and seasonal migration – e.g. 
Landy and Dupont 2010; Bhagat 2009; Lusome and Baghat 2006; Rahman and Rao 
2004; Mosse 2005; Mosse et al. 2002) and commuting in India. 
A third potential application of the atomistic perspective in India relates to studies 
on the impact of population ageing on household economy. In the absence of a large 
institutionalized system of retirement homes in India, we saw that population ageing may 
be accompanied by an increase in the number of complex household with a downward 
vector of power (CHDV), as was the case in Maharashtra from 1993 to 2004, or by an 
increase in the number of complex households with an upward vector of power (CHUV) 
(when the parental MRUs become disabled or when the karta dies and leaves his widow 
under the responsibility of his son(s)). Hence, in order to measure or anticipate the burden 
of the elderly on the everyday activities of the labor force in India, it will be of primary 
importance to determine how the transition from CHDV to CHUV unfolds across time 
and space, that is, how this transition varies across regions, castes, socioeconomic 
classes, cohorts, economic cycles, etc.  
As already seen, a fourth potential application of the atomistic perspective in India 
involves the use of longitudinal data and analysis on household formation. The numerous 
accounts of the ‘developmental cycle’ or ‘developmental process’ of households in India 
already suggest possible integrations of ethnographical descriptions within models in 
‘event-history’ or ‘survival’ analysis. As the atomistic perspectives establishes a firm 
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distinction between factors influencing the formation and interaction of MRUs, it will 
also be worthwhile to analyze these longitudinal trends and determinants with multilevel 
models incorporating the individual, the MRU to which he/she belongs, the household 
and higher levels of social organization (sub-caste, village, caste, etc.). 
Last but not least, a fifth topic of research opportunities propounded by the 
application of the atomistic perspective in India pertains to recent methodological 
developments in ‘microsimulation models’ (MSMs) and ‘agent-base models’ (ABMs) 
(e.g. Railsback and Grimm 2011; Gilbert 2008; Billari et al. 2006; Billari and Prskawatz 
2003; Van Imhoff and Post 1998; Keilman et al. 1988). These models could provide 
refined methods of household projections since they enable us to simulate interactions 
between our units of analysis: being able to apply a wide range of hypotheses on settings 
of power relationships between MRUs would certainly improve the accuracy of our 
simulations. But we must also remember that “[c]onclusions from a simulation are only 
as trustworthy as the rates and rules which the simulation takes as given” (Wachter 1987: 
215). In other words, when considering the case of Indian households, the validity of 
MSMs and ABMs depends upon the use of reliable longitudinal data and the formulation 
of precise and simple ‘rules’ of MRU formation and interaction. In spite of these 
cautions, we find reasons to be optimistic. Some studies have already shown how a high 
degree of quantitative precision in the measure of transition rates between MRUs and 
household types can be attained with the use of ‘multistate’ or ‘multidimensional’ 
methods in demography (Ledent 1995; Juby 1993); similarly, the present thesis makes an 
argument on how the atomistic perspective may already provide us with an adequate 
conceptual language to model patterns of MRU formation and interaction. It seems, 
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therefore, that the eventual applicability of MSMs and ABMs in the study of the Indian 
households ultimately depends on the quality of the statistical data available on the 
subject. 
In other words, much work remains to be done in order to explore all the 
opportunities yielded by the application of the atomistic perspective in India, and 
eventually in neighboring countries. And we did not even mention some more 
‘exogenous’ research topics suggested by some concepts used in this thesis - from 
measures of the effect of residential autonomy on maternal health, fertility, or infant 
mortality, to considerations on the role of cultural explanations in household/family 
demography. All in all, we believe that the connecting thread to such an effort has to be 
the dialogue between ethnological and statistical approaches of sociodemographic 
phenomena. This methodological debate remains open, but already we saw how, even on 
a century-old question such as the nuclearization of the Indian household, only a brief 
ethnological adjustment, underpinned by a discontinuous conceptual grid and a consistent 
set of axioms, can lead to fruitful quantitative measurements. 
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